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Political Campaign Expenditure
Limitations and the Unconstitutional
Condition Doctrine
By MARLENE ARNOLD NICHOLSON*
Introduction
The Supreme Court has said that government "may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes ... constitutionally pro-
tected interests--especially, . . . freedom of speech."' The Court has
pointed out that to hold otherwise "would allow the government to
'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' "2 In numer-
ous cases the Court has invalidated statutes that required an individual
to choose between obtaining a government benefit and freely exercising
constitutional rights.' In these cases the Court has used several differ-
ent methods of analysis: some restrictions have been invalidated be-
cause they imposed indirect burdens on constitutional rights;4 other
conditions have been viewed as violations of the Due Process Clause5
or the Equal Protection Clause.6 Such cases have been described by
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. A.B., 1961, J.D., 1968, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles. The author would like to express her appreciation to her colleagues Erwin
Chimerensky and Jeffrey Shaman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article, and to her research assistants, Paul Starkman and Kathleen Todd.
1. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
2. Id (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
3. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (state college professor could not
be denied renewal of employment because he exercised right to speak); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification of claim for unemployment benefits solely because of a
claimant's refusal to accept unemployment on Saturday, as contrary to clamaint's religious
beliefs, violated Free Exercise Clause).
5. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (property tax exemption cannot be
conditioned on loyalty oath); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (criminal
defendant who attacks prior conviction on appeal cannot be given longer sentence on
reconviction).
6. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Co., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (non-emergency
hospitalization or medical care at a county's expense cannot be conditioned on foregoing the
right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1949) (welfare benefits cannot be condi-
tioned on foregoing the right to travel).
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commentators,7 and occasionally by the Court itself,8 as involving "un-
constitutional conditions." The Burger Court has interpreted these de-
cisions narrowly in some recent cases involving statutes that place
conditions on government benefits;9 because of this trend commenta-
tors have asserted that the exercise of constitutional rights is in serious
jeopardy.' 0
In early 1980, the Court affirmed per curiam a decision of a three-
judge district court upholding the constitutionality of the federal statute
which conditions the eligibility of presidential candidates for federal
subsidies upon certification that they "will not incur expenses in excess
of the aggregate to which the candidate is entitled from the Fund,""
and that no private contributions will be used, except to the extent nec-
essary to make up any deficiency in the Fund."1 2 In Republican Na-
7. See Rubin, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction: A Critical Look at
Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Rubin]. See also Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26
MICH. L. REv. 176 (1927); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Propertv" Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne, The De-
mise ofthe Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
8. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 (1980) (basing continuation of employment
of a public defender on party affiliation is an unconstitutional condition); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-27 (1977) (requiring a public employee to pay the equivalent
of union fees to maintain public employment is not an unconstitutional condition, but such
fees cannot be used for political purposes to which the non-union employee objects). North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (imposition of more severe sentence after rever-
sal of a prisoner's original conviction is an unconstitutional condition on the right to a jury
trial). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 295, 334-37 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cali-
fornia v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 123 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bordenkircher \. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). For a discussion of these cases see infra text
accompanying notes 73 to 113. See also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983) (denying tax deductions for contributions made to non-profit organi-
zations engaged in substantial lobbying is constitutional).
The Court has granted certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of a federal
statute which prohibits editorializing by non-commercial educational broadcasting stations
accepting funds from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. League of Women Voters of
Cal. v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379 (C.D. Cal. 1982), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3344 (U.S. Nov.
1, 1983) (No. 83-651). The district court found the statute violative of the First Amendment.
The Court's disposition of the case will be important in determining the future course of the
unconstitutional condition doctrine in the Burger Court.
10. See, e.g., Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113 (1980); Rubin, supra
note 7.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b)(1) (1983).
12. Id at § 9003(b)(2).
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tional Committee v. Federal Election Commission (RNC), 3  the
constitutionality of the statute was challenged on several grounds.'
4
One of the allegations was that the restrictions placed unconstitutional
conditions upon the exercise of a candidate's constitutional right to ex-
pend unlimited sums in his or her campaign.' 5  The fact that the
Supreme Court did not write an opinion in ]?NC has further confused
the status of the unconstitutional condition doctrine.
This Article will summarize the Court's approach to unconstitu-
tional conditions, past and present, and will attempt to determine
whether RNC is indicative of a further erosion of protection under the
doctrine or whether it is consistent with a more protective approach.
The Court's decision in RAIC is significant because of what it might
signal with respect to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions gener-
ally, and because it may exemplify the vigor with which the Court will
scrutinize other statutes imposing restrictions upon fundraising and ex-
penditures in political campaigns. Although the Court has purported
13. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
14. Plaintiffs asserted that the restrictions have the effect of decreasing "grassroots"
political activity. As the court acknowledged, "[P]rivate individuals are unable to make
expenditures coordinated with the campaign organizations, such as renting vans to distribute
literature, paying the cost of photocopying and distributing campaign materials received
from the candidate's organization." 487 F. Supp. at 286. For a more detailed discussion of
the effects on grassroots activity see Ifskin, The Demise of Grassroots PoliticalActivity Under
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, N.Y. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
COLLOQUIUM, ELECTION LAW IN THE EIGHTIES, 93-97 (1980-81). This problem has been
somewhat reduced by the 1979 amendments, which permit local party organizations to raise
and spend unlimited sums for some volunteer activities. See Ifskin, supra, at 96. Further
measures to loosen the restrictions as applied to local volunteer activity may be needed to
solve this problem.
Plaintiffs asserted that the limitations discriminate in favor of incumbents and against
challengers. "Incumbents can, with less [sic] campaign expenditures and through exercise of
their official powers and use of public facilities, command more national attention than can
challengers. . . ." 487 F. Supp. at 287. Plaintiffs also alleged that the expenditure limita-
tion discriminated "against candidates not politically allied with a substantial number of
labor organizations" because the Act allows "unions to raise and spend unlimited amounts
of money on 'a variety of partisan political activities.'" Id at 288-89. The district court
responded to these allegations by asserting that the same inequities would exist under pri-
vate funding, and that the law should not "be required to remedy pre-existing inequities
between candidates." Id at 287, 289. The court commented that "[a]bsent record evidence
of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court should generally be hesi-
tant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restrictions." Id at 287
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 31 (1976)). The court also concluded that "[tihe
claim of discrimination in favor of candidates having labor union support [was] based on
speculation rather than facts." 487 F. Supp. at 289.
15. This constitutional right was recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59
(1976).
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to apply strict scrutiny1 6 to limitations upon contributions and expendi-
tures on the theory that they involve First Amendment expression
rather than "speech plus,"' 7 the actual analyses and results in cases in-
volving campaign finance restrictions are not always consistent with
that approach. 8 Thus, RNC may have more to say about the Court's
approach to campaign finance regulation in general, than it does about
the question of the Court's approach to what constitutes an unconstitu-
tional condition.
With respect to the specific question of whether overall campaign
expenditure ceilings constitute an unconstitutional condition upon the
granting of subsidies to federal candidates, presumably the Supreme
Court's summary aflirmance has settled the matter.'9 However, this
question is undecided on the state level because state courts have inter-
preted their state constitutions to prohibit as unconstitutional condi-
tions restrictions outside the campaign finance area which probably
would be upheld by the Supreme Court in a challenge based on the
federal Constitution.20 State financing schemes similar to the federal
statute have been enacted in several states and are being considered in
others.2' These statutes will be subject to the challenge that they vio-
16. Strict scrutiny review is usually described as limiting governmental actions to those
necessary to further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S., 765, 786 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 22 to 51. See also Nicholson; The Constitutional-
ity of Contribution Limitations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 ECOL. L.Q. 683, 689-700 (1981),
(hereinafter cited as Nicholson, 9 ECOL. L.Q.); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitu-
tionality of the Federal Elelction Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 WIs. L. REv. 323,
346-372, [hereinafter cited as Nicholson, 1977 Wis. L. REV.].
19. Although a summary affirmance is an adjudication on the merits and therefore has
a stare decisis effect on state and lower federal courts, the Supreme Court feels less compul-
sion to follow precedent based on summary affirmance than when dealing with precedent
supported by a written opinion. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4014, at 631 (1977). In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court held that
awarding retroactive benefits in a class action against an Illinois welfare agency violated the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court had previously granted, without discussion, retroactive
benefits in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and had summarily affirmed three
district court cases granting such awards even though the litigants had argued that the Elev-
enth Amendment precluded such benefits. In Edelman the Court commented that "Shapiro
v. Thompson and these three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value....
Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of
this Court treating the question on the merits. . .. Since we deal with a constitutional
question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas
of the law." 415 U.S. at 671.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 178-203.
21. Six states, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and Wisconsin,
impose limits on spending by political candidates who accept public financing. HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 11-223 (Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33 § 31-3 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP.
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late state constitutions. This Article will discuss the analytical and
practical strengths and weaknesses of various theories which state
courts may rely upon to uphold state campaign subsidies coupled with
expenditure limitations.
I. Campaign Finance Regulation in the Supreme Court
The Court's approach to constitutional challenges to attempts to
regulate political funding have not resulted in a model of judicial clar-
ity. The 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), for the first time presented a comprehensive, effective, and
enforceable regulatory scheme.22 In 1975, the Court reviewed these
amendments in Buckley v. Valeo ,23 the seminal case on the constitu-
tionality of campaign finance regulations. The lengthy per curiam
opinion touched on numerous aspects of the statute. Contribution lim-
its were upheld on the theory that they prevented the appearance and
reality of undue influence and corruption of elected officials.24 Limita-
tions upon independent expenditures on behalf of candidates were in-
validated because the Court viewed the burden on First Amendment
interests to be greater than that imposed by contribution limitations
and because the restrictions were insufficiently related to the legitimate
government interest in preventing corruption." The Court invalidated
limitations upon the use of a candidate's personal wealth, applying
near absolutist First Amendment reasoning.26 The majority rejected
the argument that overall campaign expenditure limitations were nec-
essary to assure compliance with the contribution limits, and it found
no other interest sufficient to justify such limitations. The Court
viewed the overall campaign expenditure ceiling as "designed primar-
ily to [reduce] the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political cam-
LAWS ANN. § 169.267 (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.32 (West Supp. 1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19.44A-7 (West Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.31 (West Supp. 1982).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163.278.31 (1982). The California Senate and Assembly have passed bills
which would publicly fund legislative campaigns and impose a campaign expenditure limi-
tation. Cal. S.B. 87, as amended, 1983-84 Sess.; Cal. A.B. 12, as amended, 1983-84 Sess.
The bills have been submitted to a conference committee. A similar bill was recently passed
by both houses of the Illinois legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. IlM. S. 938, 83rd
Gen. Assembly, 1983 Sess.
22. For the specific reforms enacted by the 1974 Amendments to the FECA see Nichol-
son, 1977 Wis. L. REv., supra note 18, at 323-24 nn. 3-6.
23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
24. Id at 26-29.
25. Id at 39-48, 50-51.
26. Id at 54. See infra note 31.
27. 424 U.S. at 55-58. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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paigns.' '2 Acknowledging that costs had risen significantly, the Court
nevertheless asserted that "the First Amendment denies government
the power to determine that spending is wasteful, excessive or un-
wise."29 In dictum, however, the Court stated that overall campaign
expenditure restrictions would be constitutional if applicable only to
candidates receiving public subsidies.30 The Court did not discuss the
issue addressed in this Article: whether such limitations should be
viewed as unconstitutional conditions.
Defendants in Buckley had rationalized all of the restrictions as a
means of equalizing the political influence of non-affluent voters and
candidates. The Court considered this rationale when reviewing limi-
tations upon a candidate's using his or her personal wealth" and the
limitations upon independent expenditures, 32 and rejected it as incon-
sistent with the First Amendment. The Court found it unnecessary to
consider the equalization rationale in order to uphold contribution lim-
its because it found preventing the appearance and reality of corrup-
tion and undue influence to be sufficient justification. 33 In dealing with
limitations upon overall campaign expenditures, the majority was
somewhat less dogmatic, but it nevertheless refused to accept the equal-
ization rationale. The Court commented that:
28. 424 U.S. at 57.
29. Id The Court also said that "[i]n the free society ordained by our Constitution, it is
not the government but the people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively
as associations and political committees-who must retain control over the quantity and
range of debate on public issues in a political campaign." Id
30. Id at 57 n.65. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
31. The Court stated that "the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [this] restriction
upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own
candidacy." 424 U.S. at 54. The Court also noted that the limitations might fail to promote
equality because the candidate's opponent might raise more funds. Id It concluded that "it
is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their
views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal quali-
ties and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day."
Id at 52-53.
32. The Court declared that "[tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly for-
eign to the First Amendment. . . . The Amendment's protection against governmental
abridgement of free expression cannot propertly be made to depend on a person's financial
ability to engage in public discussion." Id at 48-49 (citations omitted).
33. "Appellees argue that. . . the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and
groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to
affect the outcome of elections. . . . It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual
financial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
$1,000 contribution limitation." Id at 25-26.
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Given the limitations on the size of outside contributions, the fi-
nancial resources available to a candidate's campaign, like the
number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size
and intensity of the candidate's support. There is nothing invidi-
ous, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent
to carry the candidate's message to the electorate.34
It is difficult to determine the standard of review employed by the
Court to evaluate the various restrictions in Buckley. Although the per
curiam opinion relied upon cases in which strict scrutiny was explicitly
applied,35 it was less than explicit in describing the standard it was ac-
tually employing.36 The decision in Buckley may be viewed as a case
in which the strictest First Amendment review was applied to all of the
limitations. The fact that contribution limitations were upheld may
simply mean that those restrictions alone were found to be necessary to
further a compelling government interest. The Court's initial rejection
of the argument that a lesser standard of review than strict scrutiny
should apply because the limitations applied to "speech plus" rather
than "pure speech,"'37 supports this view. On the other hand, the Court
seemed to scrutinize some of the limitations more closely than others,
giving credence to the interpretation that the level of scrutiny was sub-
ject to a sliding scale, depending upon the Court's view of the burden
34. Id at 56. The Court also observed that instead of equalizing the potential of candi-
dates to influence voters, the limitation might handicap candidates without name identifica-
tion or other exposure before the start of the campaign. Id at 56-57 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Daniel Lowenstein has posited two standards of fairness-those of equality
and intensity. The standard of equality is satisfied "when both sides have a roughly equal
opportunity to present their arguments to the voters." Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and
Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REv., 505, 515 (1982). The intensity standard is satisfied when "the ability of
either side to present its arguments more or less reflects the number of people who actively
support that side and the strength of their feelings." Id
By upholding the constitutionality of contribution limitations and invalidating overall
expenditure limitations, the Court in Buckley implicitly approved the intensity standard of
fairness and rejected the equalization standard. By invalidating limitations upon independ-
ent expenditures, however, the Court rejected the intensity standard. Large independent
expenditures may simply reflect the availability of funds to a particular person or group
rather than the intensity of their support.
35. 424 U.S. at 25 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
36. In dealing with the contribution limitations, for example, the Court stated, "[w]e
find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the
weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candi-
dates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by
the $1,000 contribution ceiling." 424 U.S. at 29.
37. Id at 16-17.
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upon First Amendment interests.38  For the purposes of this Article, it
must be noted that the limitations upon overall campaign expenditures
seemed to fall somewhere in the middle. Unlike its treatment of in-
dependent expenditures and the use of a candidate's personal wealth,
the Court did not greatly stress the seriousness of the burden, and did
not speak in absolutist terms.39  Rather, the primary emphasis was
upon the inadequacy of the proffered rationales.40
Subsequent cases dealing with campaign finance regulations have
contributed little to a clear understanding of the Court's methodology.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,41 the Court seemed to apply strict
scrutiny review to invalidate a ban on corporate expenditures in ballot
measure elections.42  In California Medical Association v. FEC
38. The Court was much more deferential to Congress in dealing with campaign contri-
bution limits and the subsidy provisions than it was in dealing with limitations on the use of
personal wealth, independent expenditures, and overall campaign expenditure limits. See
Nicholson, 9 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 18, at 689-92.
39. The Court stated that the "$1,000 ceiling on spending relative to a clearly identified
candidate ... would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political
parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of
communication." 424 U.S. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). See supra notes 31-32 for examples
of absolutist language used by the Court in discussing limitations on independent expendi-
tures and the use of personal wealth. Compare these statements to the language used by the
Court in considering the overall expenditure limitations. See supra note 34 and accompany-
ing text. The Court did observe that all expenditure limitations "impose direct and substan-
tial restraints on the quantity of political speech. 424 U.S. at 39. Nevertheless, the limitation
upon independent expenditures was said to be the "most drastic." Id at 39. The Court
described the burden created by overall expenditure limitations in the following terms: "Al-
though the Act's limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties
provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate [than independent expenditure
limitations] they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congres-
sional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candi-
dates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling." Id at 20.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's rejection of
the proffered rationales.
41. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
42. The Court stated that "the State may prevail only upon a showing of a subordinat-
ing interest which is compelling." Id at 786. It further explained that "the state must em-
ploy means "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement. d The Court rejected the
equalization rationale. Id at 790-92. It found insufficient evidence to support a finding that
corporations were dominating the electoral process and thus causing voter estrangement.
Id at 789-90. Although the majority expressed doubt that there was a sufficient governmen-
tal interest in protecting dissenting shareholders, id at 794 n.34, it assumed "arguendo, that
[such] protection [was] a 'compelling' interest." Id at 795. However, the Court found "no
substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's
effort to prohibit [corporations] from speaking"; as a result, the statute was found to be both
overbroad and underinclusive. Id (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,485 (1980)). It
should be noted that the reference to a "substantially relevant correlation" resembles the
language of middle tier analysis used in gender-based discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
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(CMA), 4 a plurality of the Court apparently rejected strict scrutiny
review in upholding limitations upon contributions made to multi-can-
didate political committees.44 The Court's consistency in striking down
independent expenditure limitations and upholding contribution limi-
tations was shattered in 1981 when the Court, in an eight to one deci-
sion, invalidated a statute limiting contributions in ballot measure
elections. Ignoring CMA, the majority appeared to apply strict scru-
tiny review to the limitations at issue in Citizens Against Rent Control
(CARC) v. Berkeley.45 CMA was, however, relied on the following year
in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee
(NR WC),46 a unanimous opinion written by Justice Rehnquist uphold-
ing that portion of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act which greatly re-
stricts the freedom of corporations without shareholders or members to
43. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion).
44. "Because we conclude that the challenged limitation does not restrict the ability of
individuals to engage in protected political advocacy, Congress was not required to select the
least restrictive means of protecting the integrity of its legislative scheme." Id at 199 n.20.
See Nicholson, 9 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 18, at 698. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun invoked the standard of strict scrutiny. 453 U.S. at 201.
45. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). See generally Nicholson, 9 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 18.
The summary affirmance by an equally divided Court in Common Cause v. Schmitt,
455 U.S. 129 (1982), was somewhat surprising. The case involved the constitutionality of
limitations upon independent expenditures made by political action committees in support
of presidential candidates accepting public subsidies. A three judge district court unani-
mously found the restrictions unconstitutional. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980). Eight Jus-
tices agreed in Buckley that limitations upon independent expenditures by individuals were
unconstitutional, yet four Justices voted to uphold the committee restrictions in Schmitt.
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has taken the position that the Supreme Court's
decision has no precedential effect and has attempted to continue to enforce the restrictions.
The Commission recently relitigated the issue and lost in Democratic Party v. NCPAC, 578
F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction, 52
U.S.L.W. 3756 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984) (83-1122), but denied without comment petitioner's re-
quest for expedited review which would have enabled the Court to resolve the issue prior to
the 1984 general election. See Court Plans No Early Ruling on PAC Limits, N.Y. Times,
May 1, 1984, at A27, col. 3.
In Schmitt, the plaintiff had argued that there is a greater danger of corruption when
political committees make independent expenditures than when the expenditures are made
by individuals. Committees are usually able to amass larger sums than individuals, and,
because they are spent by professional managers, they are of greater aid to the campaigns. It
was asserted that the managers of these huge aggregations of money, rather than the contrib-
utors, are the beneficiaries of undue influence. Brief for Appellants, at 27, 28, 37, Schmitt,
512 F. Supp. at 489. The district court ignored this argument; instead, the court adopted the
position taken by the Court in Buckley that independent expenditures provide little assist-
ance and therefore are unlikely to result in undue influence. 512 F. Supp. at 495. The
district court stressed the burden on freedom of association, declaring that contributors to
political committees, unlike contributors to candidates, share a "community of political in-
terest" and "express themselves through the political committees." Id at 497. A similar
argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in CARC, 454 U.S. at 294-300 (1981).
46. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
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solicit for contributions to their political action committees (PACs).4 7
The language in NR WC was startlingly different in approach and tone
from Bellotti. Indeed, the Court in NR WC seemed to apply very little
scrutiny to the limitations.4 8 Furthermore, the opinion made numerous
unnecessarily sweeping statements regarding the power of Congress to
restrict participation by corporations and unions in political fundrais-
ing.49 In a number of earlier cases, the Supreme Court had strained to
avoid deciding whether the restrictions on union and corporate polit-
ical fundraising and expenditures were constitutional." Now the Court
seems to be signaling that such restrictions are constitutional and that,
47. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (1982).
48. The Court stated that "This careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral
laws, in a cautious advance, 'step by step' . . . to account for the particular legal and eco-
nomic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference
. .. 459 U.S. at 209 (citations omitted). The Court distinguished Belloti on the basis
that it involved restrictions on ballot measure elections and therefore did not involve
preventing corruption of public officials. Since the statute authorizes corporations to solicit
contributions to their PACs only from "stockholders and their families and [their] executive
or administrative personnel and their families," 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(4)(A) (1982), and, in the
case of membership corporations, allows solicitation from members, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(c)
(1982), corporations with neither members nor shareholders would be extremely restricted in
their ability to raise funds for PACs and would be nearly barred from making political
contributions. Presumably, such PACs' only real sources of funds would be administrative
or executive personnel. The Court did not explain why such a restriction was necessary to
prevent corruption. It also did not address the question whether less restrictive means were
available.
49. See supra note 48. The Court also stated that "[The statute reflects a legislative
judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly care-
ful regulation. . . .While § 441b restricts the solicitation of corporations and labor unions
without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Con-
gress' judgment that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation." 459 U.S.
at 209-10. It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion in NRWC, had
dissented in Bellotti, arguing in part that because of the corporate nature of the entities the
states had extensive power to regulate their political activities. 435 U.S. at 822-27. Indeed,
his language in Bellotti is strikingly similar to his opinion in NRJV . In Bellotti, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that "the Congress of the United States and the legislatures of 30 other
States of this Republic have considered the matter, and have concluded that restrictions
upon the political activity of business corporations are both politically desirable and consti-
tutionally permissible. The judgments of such a broad consensus of governmental bodies
over a period of many decades is entitled to considerable deference from the Court." 435
U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Compare this statement with the language of the
majority opinion in NRWC reproduced supra note 48.
50. See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (statute does not
prohibit expenditures from separate, segregated account funded by voluntary contributions);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 1061 (1948) (statute does not prevent internal union commu-
nications). In United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Court reversed a judgment
that had dismissed an indictment against the union under the predecessor statute of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. In that case, the Court refused to "antici-
pate (the) constitutional questions," stating: "[Only an adjudication on the merits can pro-
vide the concrete factual setting that sharpens the deliberative process especially demanded
Spring 19831 SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
so long as the stated aim is preventing corruption, Congress will have a
free hand to even further restrict such entities.5
As the next section will elucidate, the Court does not apply the
unconstitutional condition doctrine in every instance in which a person
is required to forego the exercise of a constitutional right in order to
obtain a government benefit. It has refused to apply the doctrine to
rights that it describes as merely "qualified."52 Although there are no
clear guidelines as to which rights should be viewed as qualified, com-
mon sense suggests that the Court's view as to the importance of the
right and the degree of burden are factors. As the foregoing discussion
illustrates, the Court's perception of the significance of restrictions on
campaign financing emerges as muddled, at best. Its wavering and in-
explicit analyses in the campaign finance cases provide little guidance.
Further confusion exists because the specific restriction on which this
Article focuses-limitations upon overall campaign expenditures-
for constitutional decision. . . .[B]y remanding the case for trial it may well be that the
Court will not be called upon to pass on the questions now raised." Id at 591-92.
51. This view is reinforced by the Court's recent denial of certiorari in a case upholding
the constitutionality of bans on direct contributions and expenditures in federal elections by
commercial corporations. Athens Lumber Co. v. FEC, 52 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 19,
1984). The appellate court had determined that the question was settled by N.RWC. 718
F.2d 363 (1I1th Cir., 1983) (en banc) (per curiam).
The Court could have decided NRWC on narrower grounds. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals had construed the definition of "member" in the statute broadly so that the commit-
tee's solicitation of persons who were not considered members of a corporation under state
corporations statutes, but who had evidenced support for the committee through responses
to mailings, could be solicited for contributions to the corporate political action committee.
459 U.S. at 202-03. The Supreme Court commented that the Circuit Court's "construction
was reached at least in part because of concern for the constitutional implications of any
narrower construction." Id at 201. The Supreme Court seemed to be unwilling to cast
doubt on the constitutionality of a broad construction of the statute by invoking a narrowing
construction. This approach is very different from that of earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court dealing with restrictions on corporate and union political fundraising. See supra note
50.
The Court in NRWC also might have avoided the sweeping pronouncements regarding
the power of Congress to regulate the political activities of corporations by asserting that the
burden on the Committee was small in as much as it simply could have used the form of a
membership corporation under state law, and thus would have been entitled to solicit contri-
butions from its members. The Committee argued in its brief before the Supreme Court,
however, that it was "incorporated under Virginia law.. . (which). . . required. . . an
annual meeting of all members, a prohibitively expensive requirement." Brief for Respon-
dents at 25 n.12. VRWC, 459 U.S. at 197. The Committee stated further that such a meet-
ing would serve "no purpose in the context of a corporation organized not for profit or other
business purposes, but for promotion of a political philosophy." Id
52. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76. A recent case also suggests that the Court
will not apply the doctrine when the government refuses to subsidize the exercise of some
First Amendment activity so long as the refusal is not based on point of view. Regan, 103 S.
Ct. at 202-03. See supra note 9.
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were dealt with in Buckley as neither the most heinous, nor the most
insignificant of the various restrictions.
The only pattern that emerges from the campaign finance cases is
that after Buckley the Court has not invalidated a statute which was
rationalized as preventing the corruption of public officials. 3 RNC is
consistent with that pattern. The summary affirmance in RNC seem-
ingly means that the Court either viewed the unconstitutional condition
analysis as inapplicable, or that the restrictions would survive the strin-
gent review required by the unconstitutional condition doctrine. It
should be recalled that despite RNC, state courts could determine that
similar restrictions do violate state constitutions. Had the Court chosen
to write an opinion, it might have provided some guidance as to the
appropriate means of dealing with this issue. Furthermore, a choice by
the Court between the two alternatives to affirmance might have shed
light on two murky areas of constitutional law. A written opinion
could have given some hint as to the approach the Court will take in
future cases dealing with other campaign restrictions. It also might
have clarified the Court's current approach to the application of the
unconstitutional condition doctrine generally. As will be seen in the
next section, such a clarification is needed.
II. The Unconstitutional Condition: Supreme Court Doctrine
A. The "Right-Privilege" Distinction
In 1892, Justice Holmes propounded an analysis which came to be
known as the "right-privilege" distinction. 4 In McAulfe v. Mayor of
New Bedford,55 a former policeman contended that the city could not
fire him for engaging in political activities. Justice Holmes disagreed,
commenting that "[T]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."5
Thus, the essence of the doctrine was that if one has received a "privi-
lege" from the government that could be withheld absolutely, then that
grant could also be withheld conditionally; the fact that the condition
standing alone would violate one's constitutional rights was considered
insignificant. 7
53. In Buckley, however, the Court rejected the argument that individual expenditure
limitations and overall campaign expenditure limitations could be justified as a means of
preventing corruption. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
54. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 168-7 1; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-64 (1968).
55. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
56. Id at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
57. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509-10 (1978).
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Perhaps the clearest articulation of the right-privilege distinction
by the Supreme Court occurred in Adler v. Board of Education." In
Adler, the Court upheld a statute that made membership in the Com-
munist Party a prima facie basis for dismissing a teacher. The Court
stated that:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to as-
semble, speak, think and believe as they will. . . . It is equally
clear that they have no right to work for the State. . . on their
own terms. . . . If they do not choose to work on [terms set down
by the state] they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associa-
tions and go elsewhere.59
B. Abandonment of the "Right-Privilege" Distinction
Shortly after Adler, the "right-privilege" distinction began to dis-
integrate. In Weiman v. Updegraff,6 ° decided the same year as Adler,
the Court invalidated a loyalty oath requirement for state employees.
A series of Warren Court decisions completed the process of disintegra-
tion. In Sherbert v. Verner,61 the Supreme Court found that a Seventh
Day Adventist's unemployment benefits were unconstitutionally de-
nied because receipt of those benefits was conditioned upon her availa-
bility for Saturday work. The Court explicitly rejected the "right-
privilege" distinction: "[I]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liber-
ties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."62 The Court stated
that "[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of
one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions,
that law is constitutionaly [sic] invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect."' Finally, in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents,' the Court effectively overruled Adler by holding that
membership in the Communist Party alone could not constitutionally
bar one from the privilege of teaching.65
58. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
59. Id at 492 (citations omitted).
60. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
62. Id at 404.
63. Id
64. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
65. Prior to Keyishian, the Court had held that membership in the Communist Party
could not constitutionally be prohibited unless the member also had a specific intent to
facilitate an unlawful end. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1961).
Richard Rubin has explained that "the key to the Court's shift from decisions like. ..
Adler to those such as Sherbert . . . [was the] equation of an indirect burden. . . in the
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When analyzing conditions placed upon the exercise of constitu-
tional rights, the Warren Court first determined whether there was an
actual impingement on a constitutional right.6 If the law either dis-
couraged67 or placed a detriment 68 upon the exercise of a right, an im-
pingement was found. The Court then applied strict scrutiny review
which required that the restrictions be necessary to a compelling gov-
ernment interest.6 9
C. Unconstitutional Conditions in the Burger Court
Although the Burger Court has applied the unconstitutional condi-
tion doctrine in much the same way as the Warren Court in dealing
with some First Amendment questions,7" it has refused to apply the
doctrine in the context of abortion funding7' and plea bargaining.72 In
these important cases, the Court has qualified the doctrine in ways that
could result in a less stringent approach to future unconstitutional con-
dition cases. Discussion in this Article will focus upon the abortion
funding cases because, as in RNC, they involve the failure to fund the
exercise of a constitutional right. In Maher v. Roe,73 the Supreme
Court upheld a state welfare regulation that denied Medicaid funding
for abortions not necessary to the mother's physical and psychological
well-being. The Court did not approach the issue in Maher by apply-
form of a ... condition, with a direct sanction placed upon the exercise of a constitutional
right." Rubin, supra note 7, at 172. Rubin also has pointed out that the "indirect violation
of right" doctrine has been applied primarily in speech and religion cases. Id In United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), however, the Court struck down a provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act that had the effect of exposing only those defendants who chose a
jury trial to the possibility of capital punishment.
66. Rubin, supra note 7, at 173.
67. Id (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 604, 609; United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-83; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404-05).
68. Rubin, supra note 7, at 173 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 607; Jackson, 390 U.S. at
581-83; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406).
69. Rubin, supra note 7, at 174 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 608-10; Jackson, 390 U.S.
at 582; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406). Rubin points out that in some cases the Court did not
explicitly apply the compelling state interest test, although such a test probably would have
been satisfied. Rubin, supra note 7, at 174 n.57. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (restrictions on political activities of
federal employees upheld).
70. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
(conditioning continuation of government employment on political affiliation violates First
Amendment rights of employees). But see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (up-
holding a contractual requirement that former CIA employees submit any manuscript about
CIA activities for prepublication review).
71. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
72. Bordenkircher v. Hays, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
73. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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ing the analysis developed in earlier unconstitutional condition cases.74
Instead, the majority decided that the constitutional right to an abor-
tion, which the Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 75 is "not. . .an un-
qualified 'constitutional right' . . . . Rather, the right protects the
woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to de-
cide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
76
The Court distinguished Shapiro v. Thompson77 and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County78 as involving penalties on the exercise of
the constitutional right to travel. 79 According to the Court, those cases
"recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised
the right to travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a crim-
inal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny."80 Rejecting the notion that
the state "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by re-
fusing to pay for it, the Court asserted that the analogy to Shapiro and
Maricopa would be more appropriate if the state had denied general
welfare benefits to all women who had obtained abortions.8 Thus, de-
nial of funding that enables a person to exercise a constitutional right is
not a penalty, but denial of other benefits because he or she chooses to
exercise such a right would be considered a penalty.82 The emphasis is
not upon the effect of the burden created by the condition, but upon its
form. Unlike the approach of the Warren Court, under this analysis,
neither deterence nor hardship are important in determining whether
an unconstitutional condition exists.83 This position was made even
clearer in Harris v. McRae, when the Court upheld a federal statute
denying funding for medically necessary abortions.84 The Court in
Harris stated that "[a]lthough government may not place obstacles in
the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not
74. The Court approached the issue as an equal protection question. Id at 469-80.
Finding no suspect class or fundamental right, the Court applied a mere rational basis test.
Id
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. 432 U.S. at 473-74.
77. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
78. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
79. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8.
80. Id. at 475 n.8.
81. Id at 474-75 n.8.
82. The Court asserted that "a substantial constitutional question would arise if Con-
gress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible [woman]
simply because [she] had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her
pregnancy by abortion." Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
83. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 72-73. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
84. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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remove those not of its own creation."8 5
The most startling aspect of the Maher-Harris analysis is that it
accepts deterring the exercise of a constitutional right as a legitimate
government interest.86 The Court saw "a basic difference between di-
rect state interference with a protected activity and state encourage-
ment of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."8"
Thus, the state was free "to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds."88
Of particular interest for purposes of this Article is the fact that the
Court in Maher cited Buckley v. Valeo to support the distinction be-
tween interference with the exercise of a constitutional right and state
encouragement of an alternative activity.89 According to the Court,
this distinction was the basis of its rejection in Buckley of a constitu-
tional challenge to the subsidy provisions that deny funding to candi-
dates of parties which cannot demonstrate certain thresholds of
numerical support in past elections.90 In rejecting the analogy to the
ballot access cases in which strict scrutiny was said to have been ap-
85. Id at 316. In Harris, the Court further asserted that "regardless of whether the
freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core
or periphery of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a
woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial re-
sources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." Id
86. See infra text accompanying notes 223-41 for a discussion of the role of intent in
unconstitutional condition analysis.
87. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 (footnote omitted).
88. Id at 474.
89. Id at 475 n.9.
90. Id The amendments to the Revenue Act of 1972 provided for funding in the gen-
eral election for presidential candidates of parties defined as "major" or "minor." I.R.C.
§ 9003 (amended 1976). A major party is one whose candidate received 25% or more of the
popular vote in the preceding presidential election. I.R.C. § 9002(b). A "minor" party is
one whose candidate received 5% or more but less than 25% of the vote. I.R.C. § 9002(7).
Minor parties receive a portion of the major party entitlement that is equal to the ratio of the
votes received by the minor party's candidate in the preceding election to the average of the
votes obtained by the candidates of the major parties in that election. I.R.C.
§ 9004(a)(2)(A). New parties obtain no pre-election funding, but may obtain reimbursement
for outstanding debts after the election, based upon the actual vote of the new party in the
election in question in relation to the average number of votes garnered by the major parties.
I.R.C. § 9004(2)(B). Denial of pre-election funding to candidates of small parties could be
viewed as an unconstitutional condition in that they would have to give up their right to run
as third party candidates, and instead run as major party candidates in order to receive
government funds. However, a candidate cannot simply decide to run as a major party
candidate. Thus, denial of funding does not involve two clearly alternative actions in the
same way as choosing abortion or childbirth, or agreeing or refusing to agree to an expendi-
ture limitation. The Court did not address an unconstitutional condition issue in Buckley.
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plied, 9' the Maher Court pointed out that the opinion in Buckley dis-
tinguished "direct burdens" imposed by such restrictions from the
denial of public financing.92 The latter was viewed as "not restrictive
of voters' rights and less restrictive of candidates. '9 3 Quoting from
Buckley, the Court in Maher explained,
[tihe inability, if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective
campaigns will derive notfrom lack ofpublicfunding but from their
inability to raise private contributions. Any disadvantage suffered
by operation of the eligibility formulae... is thus limited to the
claimed denial of the enhancement of opportunity to communi-
cate with the electorate that the formulae afforded eligible
candidates. 94
However, it is not clear whether the Court in Buckley meant that
the "denial of the enhancement of the opportunity to communicate"
would never require strict scrutiny review. Indeed, the Court was
somewhat ambiguous with respect to the standard of review applied to
the denial of subsidies.95 Furthermore, in Buckley, the Court stressed
that candidates receiving subsidies have a "countervailing denial" due
to overall campaign expenditure limitations.96 It was in part due to this
factor that the Court in Buckley considered the burden on ineligible
candidates to be less significant than the burden on those denied ballot
access.
97
It would be inappropriate to conclude that the reference in Buck-
ley to expenditure limitations as a countervailing denial settled the
91. 424 U.S. at 93-95. There is some question whether strict scrutiny was actually ap-
plied in all of the ballot access cases. See Nicholson, 1977 Wis. L. REv., supra note 18, at
355-56.
92. 432 U.S. at 475-76 n.9 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94-95 (emphasis added by the
Maker Court)).
93. Id
94. Id (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94-95) (emphasis added by the Maher Court).
95. After concluding that "public financing is generally less restrictive of access to the
electoral process than... ballot-access regulations," the Court stated, "[i]n a y event, Con-
gress enacted Subtitle H in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests and
has not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political opportunity of any party or candi-
date." 424 U.S. at 95-96. "Sufficiently important" could be another way to describe "com-
pelling." The language, however, is similar to that of intermediate scrutiny used in gender
discrimination cases. See e.g. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1974) ("classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objeclives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"). However, the reference to necessity is more common in
strict scrutiny review. See supra note 16.
96. 424 U.S. at 95.
97. It should be noted that this factor weakens Buckley as support for the Court's hold-
ings in the abortion funding cases because those choosing childbirth over abortion suffer no
"countervailing denial."
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question of the constitutionality of those limitations." The challenge
in Buckley was based upon the argument that the ineligible candidates
were disadvantaged vis a vis those who were eligible. The expenditure
limits applicable to candidates receiving subsidies were not challenged
in Buckley; the Court merely recognized that these limits equalize, at
least to some extent, 99 the burdens allocated by the statute upon candi-
dates eligible for subsidies and those ineligible for funding. Presuma-
bly, if such limitations were later challenged and found to be
unconstitutional, the Court could reconsider the challenge of ineligible
party candidates rejected in Buckley.
The Burger Court's approach to alleged unconstitutional condi-
tions apparently has qualified that of the Warren Court. It has articu-
lated a standard that would not require the application of strict scrutiny
analysis when a burden upon a constitutional right is "indirect," unless
the burden can be viewed as a penalty."°° Although the Court's con-
ception of what constitutes a penalty is not clear, 10 it appears that the
Burger Court does not view the failure to pay for the exercise of consti-
tutional rights as a penalty.102 This may have been the basis of the
Court's summary affirmance in RAC.O3 However, because state courts
need not make the same distinction in interpreting their constitutions, it
is important to determine whether the distinction is a convincing one.
In Maher, the Court pointed to earlier cases that seemingly had
accepted the proposition that it is not necessary to apply strict scrutiny
when government refuses to fund the exercise of a constitutional right.
For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Court invalidated a
98. The district court in RJNC apparently concluded that the Court's reference in Buck-
ley to the expenditure limitations as a "countervailing denial" somehow made the Court's
comments regarding the constitutionality of the unchallenged expenditure limitation condi-
tions a holding rather than mere dicta. See 487 F. Supp. at 284 n.6. See also infra notes 130-
33 and accompanying text.
99. The Court did observe, however, that the limitations may fail to equalize because
they would "handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of
his views before the start of the campaign." 424 U.S. at 57.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 70-85.
101. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 212-14.
102. The Court made its position clear in Maher: "ITihe claim here is that the State
'penalizes' the woman's decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and
Maricopa did not hold that States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to
pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers." 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. This view is reinforced
by the recent case in which the Court upheld the denial of tax deductions for contributions
made to non-profit organizations engaged in substantial lobbying. Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
103. The district court in RNC purported to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged re-
strictions. See infra text accompanying notes 128-77.
104. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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statute that made it a crime to send a child to a private school; never-
theless, in Norwood v. Harrison,105 nearly fifty years later, the Court
rejected the argument that private schools must receive state aid.' °6 In
addition, the Court in Maher quoted dicta from Meyer v. Nebraska for
the proposition that, although it cannot be made a crime to teach chil-
dren in elementary school a foreign language, "the power of the State
'to prescribe a curriculum' that included English and excluded German
in its free public schools 'is not questioned.' "107
Despite these cases, other situations involving a failure by the gov-
ernment to provide funding might be analyzed differently by the Court.
For instance, a statute might grant subsidies only to elementary private
schools that did not teach foreign languages, or only to schools that
teach the negative aspects of abortion. Such statutes probably would
be seen by the Court as analogous to the statutes in Pierce and Meyer
and would be invalidated because they impinge on teachers' rights of
expression and parents' right to choose the appropriate education for
their children.'0 8 It is unlikely that the Court would apply a rational
basis test in such cases on the ground that the fact patterns involve
mere failures to fund the exercise of constitutional rights, rather than
penalties.
The public forum cases also offer analogies. Should the Court ap-
ply strict scrutiny to a statute that authorizes the use of a public audito-
rium to those who wish to speak in favor of child birth and against
abortion, but prohibits advocates of the opposing point of view from
using the auditorium? It is clear that strict scrutiny review would be
appropriate,'0 9 despite the Court's finding in Maher that encouraging
normal childbirth is a legitimate state interest.1'0 The Court probably
105. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
106. 432 U.S. at 477. The Court in Norwood stated that "[it is one thing to say that a
state may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such
schools must, as a matter of equal protection receive state aid." 413 U.S. at 462 quoted in
Maher, 432 U.S. at 477.
107. 432 U.S. at 477 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
108. In Aeyer v. Nebraska, the Court described plaintiff's right to teach and the parents'
right to "engage him so to instruct their children" as within the guarantee of liberty secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 262 U.S. at 400.
109. See infra note 189. In Harris, Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "surely the
Government could not provide free transportation to the polling booths only for those citi-
zens who vote for Democratic candidates." 448 U.S. at 336 n.6.
110. Another method of encouraging normal childbirth would be to pay the expenses of
candidates who speak in favor of encouraging normal childbirth and against abortion.
Professors Laurence Tribe and Jesse Choper have discussed the hypothetical situaton of
subsidies given only to one political party. J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (1981). Tribe's position was that strict
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would distinguish such cases from Maher on the basis that First
Amendment rights, unlike the right to an abortion, are unqualified.' 1
The state cannot constitutionally make judgments that favor the exer-
cise of certain First Amendment rights over others. ' 12 In Aaher, the
Court distinguished Sherbert v. Verner," 3 partly because "that case was
decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally im-
posed 'governmental obligation of neutrality' originating in the Estab-
lishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment."114
It is not clear whether the Court views the rights implicated in
limiting total campaign expenditures as being qualified or unqualified.
The Court in Buckley purported to equate money with speech; the right
to freedom of speech should be as unqualified as the right to the free
exercise of religion. Likewise, the same "governmental obligation of
neutrality"" 5 is involved when dealing with either First Amendment
right. Certainly there is a "governmental obligation of neutrality" if
regulation of the content of speech is at issue." 6 Probably everyone
would agree that government could not condition subsidies on a candi-
date's promise not to discuss certain issues.' 17 However, because the
scrutiny should not be applied to situations in which the government merely fails to provide
funds. However, he would invalidate the hypothetical statute because it advances "only the
wholly illegitimate interest of... encouraging one political party to win at the expense of
the other." Id at 256. He considers "no Political Establishment" as implicit in the Constitu-
tion and "no less axiomatic than the right to vote, which is also not mentioned in the Consti-
tution." Id at 256-57.
Professor Choper responded that such a statute would be unconstitutional because of
the legislative intent to favor "one person's exercise of his constitutional rights. . . as op-
posed to another's." Id at 281-82. Choper would apply strict scrutiny review whenever an
intent to burden a constitutional right is established. For a discussion of the significance of
purpose to unconstitutional condition analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 223-41.
11I. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
112. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971) (statute cannot pro-
hibit all but peaceful labor picketing near school). But cf. Regan, supra note 9.
113. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
114. 432 U.S. at 474-75, n.8 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409).
115. Id
116. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that content discrimination is unconstitu-
tional. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536-37
(1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Nevertheless, the Court
has upheld numerous restrictions upon content. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 545
n.2. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing cases where subject matter was a permissible considera-
tion in the state's restriction on speech forms).
117. Although Professors Laurence Tribe and Jesse Choper disagree about the correct-
ness of Harris and Maher, both agree, although for different reasons, that it would be uncon-
stitutional to fund only those people who work for one political party. J. CHOPER, Y.
KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 256, 281. In Regan, see supra note 9, the statute
was upheld in part because it was "'not aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 103
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expenditure limitations restrict the quantity rather than the content of
expression, arguably the analogy to Sherbert is inappropriate.' 18
Apparently, the government's obligation of neutrality in dealing
with free exercise issues required the application of strict scrutiny in
Sherbert even though the burden on religious exercise took the indirect
form of a condition to receive government largesse. 1" 9 Does the gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality in dealing with burdens on the
quantity of campaign speech require that strict scrutiny apply to condi-
tions which limit the quantity of campaign expression in the pursuit of
a legitimate state objective? Presumably the government's duty should
prevent it from mandating expenditure limits on the ground that the
quantity of campaign speech is excessive. In Buckley, the Court
stressed that government has no business deciding how much speech is
too much. 20 But in Sherbert the Court went further. The restriction in
that case seemed to involve no element of intentional action to disad-
vantage a particular religion, yet strict scrutiny was applied.' Like-
wise, in JNC the statute has legitimate government purposes, 122 and
limiting the quantity of speech because the government thinks there is
too much, was not asserted as a rationale.
How does one decide when the obligation of neutrality arises?
Prior to the abortion funding cases, it could have been argued that the
degree of burden on the individual is decisive determinative.' 23 Now it
appears that the Court will simply pick and choose among the various
constitutional rights, and will require neutrality based upon the indi-
S. Ct. at 2002-03 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 462, 513 (1959). See also
discussion of League of Women Voters, supra note 9.
118. The Court in Regan asserted that the fact that the organization "did not have as
much money as it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would
like" did not render the statute unconstitutional. 103 S. Ct. at 2003. The expenditure restric-
tions could be viewed as involving subject matter discrimination in that they restrict speech
advocating the election of some candidates. In Consolidated Edison, the Court rejected the
argument that subject matter restrictions, as opposed to point of view constraints, do not
require strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, prior to Consolidated Edison, the Court had been more
protective of point of view than of subject matter restraint. See Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion in Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 n.2. It is likely that the Court will continue
this unarticulated dual level of protection. See generally Stone, Restrictions on Speech Be-
cause of Its Content, 46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 81 (1978). The ambiguous state of the unconstitu-
tional condition doctrine makes this an area in which the Court might choose to make such a
distinction. Indeed, the Court in Regan ignored Consolidated Edison, did not apply strict
scrutiny and did not describe lobbying as involving subject matter discrimination.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. See infra text accompanying note 234.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 141-77.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69, 80-83.
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vidual policy choice of five or more Justices. 124 Predictions are even
more problematic because the confusion in the campaign finance regu-
lation cases12 5 makes it difficult to determine the Court's policy prefer-
ences in this area.
One can only guess whether the Supreme Court's summary affirm-
ance in RNC was based upon strict scrutiny or a lesser standard of
review such as the approach used in Maher.16 As will be shown in the
next section, however, the district court in RNC did purport to apply
strict scrutiny to the restrictions.2 7 Since state courts may follow that
approach, it is important to consider whether the court in RNC prop-
erly applied that standard.
III. The RNC District Court Opinion
The district court in RNC framed the issue as whether Congress
could "condition a presidential candidate's eligibility for public federal
campaign funds upon the candidate's voluntary acceptance of limita-
tions on campaign expenditures and private contributions."'' l2  The
court concluded that "as long as the candidate remains free to engage
in unlimited private funding and spending instead of limited public
funding," the statute did not violate First Amendment rights. 129 Quot-
ing from a footnote to the Supreme Court opinion in Buckley, the dis-
trict court explained that:
"Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns
and may condition acceptance ofpublic funds on an agreement by
the candidate to abide by spec~ied expenditure limitations. Just as
a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he
124. See infra text accompanying note 243.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 22-53.
126. One might attempt to distinguish RNC from Maher and Harris on the ground that
in those cases the government had decided not to fund a particular medical procedure. In
the campaign subsidy situation, however, the government had decided to fund campaigns
generally and discriminate against those who choose to exercise their right to expend unlim-
ited sums. Such an approach involves little more than semantics. If the government benefit
in the abortion cases is described broadly as funding for the resolution of pregnancy, the
government's choice to fund one means of resolution and not another discriminates against
those who choose to exercise their right to abortion. Although it is true that a better analogy
to the abortion cases would involve subsidies for only certain kinds of campaigning, the
crucial similarity between RNC and the abortion funding cases is that there are two clear
alternatives, both of which are protected by the Constitution. The choice of one results in
funding, the choice of the other does not.
127. The district court in RNC did not even cite to Maher or Harris.
128. 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.), affdmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
129. Id at 284.
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chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo [sic] private fundraising
"5130
The district court disagreed with the plaintiff's assertion that this
passage was mere dictum; the court pointed out that in Buckley the
subsidy allocation provisions were challenged by ineligible candidates.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, noting that those who receive
public subsidies suffer a "countervailing denial" because they must
abide by expenditure limitations.' Apparently the lower court con-
cluded that by relying upon the effect of such limitations as one reason
for finding the subsidy allocation formula constitutional, the Court im-
plied that the limitations were also constitutional. This interpretation,
however, is certainly not a necessary one.' 32 In any event, because the
expenditure limitations imposed on candidates receiving public subsi-
dies were not challenged in Buckley, the quoted language should have
been considered no more than strong dicta. Of course, after the sum-
mary affirmance by the Supreme Court in RVC, the issue is academic:
such limitations are valid under the federal Constitution.133 The re-
maining uncertainties concern the Court's reasoning in RNC and
whether the state courts will find such limitations valid under their
state constitutions.
In RNC, the district court began its analysis of the allegation that
the limitations impose an unconstitutional condition by making the fol-
lowing assertion:
[t]he fact that a statute requires an individual to choose between
two methods of exercising the same constitutional right does not
render the law invalid, provided the statute does not diminish a
protected right or, where there is such a diminution the burden is
justified by a compelling state interest. 134
The court concluded that there was no "diminution" caused by the ex-
penditure limitations, and even if there was, "the burden attributable to
the limits imposed by the legislation [was] fully justified by the compel-
130. Id (quoting 424 U.S. at 57 n.65) (emphasis added by the RNC court).
131. 487 F. Supp. at 284 n.6 (construing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. In California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453
U.S. 182 (1981), the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a contribution limitation
that had the effect of restricting the funds an unincorporated association could use to admin-
ister its political action committees. The Court stated that the fact that corporations and
labor unions were not subject to the limitation was irrelevant because other restrictions ap-
plicable to those groups resulted in "farfewer restrictions on . . .unincorporated associa-
tions." Id at 200 (emphasis in original). The Court commented that appellants had not
challenged the limitations upon corporate and union activity. Id at 201. Such a challenge
would not be foreclosed by CMA any more than a challenge to the expenditure limits im-
posed on candidates accepting subsidies should have been foreclosed by Buckley.
133. See supra note 19 regarding the legal effect of a summary affirmance.
134. 487 F. Supp. at 284-85 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403).
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ling state interests."'' 35
The district court's initial conclusion that there was no First
Amendment burden was apparently based upon its characterization of
the statute as "merely [providing] a presidential candidate with an addi-
tional funding alternative which he or she would not otherwise
have."' 136 The court reasoned that "[s]ince the candidate remains free
to choose between funding alternatives, he or she will opt for public
funding only if it will enhance the candidate's powers of communica-
tion and association." 37 However, some candidates may choose public
funding for reasons other than enhancing their ability to communi-
cate.' 38 Indeed, as the district court acknowledged in RNC, both candi-
dates in the 1972 presidential election raised and spent more than the
presidential candidates received in subsidies in 1976 or 1980.131
In Buckley, the Court equated the quantity of money spent with
the quantity of expression. If one assumes that the limitations diminish
the quantity of speech, then based on the Court's opinion in Buckley,
the issue must be analyzed as involving a burden upon First Amend-
ment interests.' 40 The district court in RNC might have determined,
relying on Maher and Harris, that even if there were a burden on ex-
pression, strict scrutiny analysis was not necessary. Instead, that court
purported to apply strict scrutiny, asserting that even if there was some
burden on the First Amendment rights of candidates, the statutory
scheme was supported by compelling state interests. 14
IV. The Compelling Interests
The interests described by the district court in RNC included
preventing the
"great drain on [candidates'] time and energies" required by fun-
draising "at the expense of providing competitive debate of the
135. 487 F. Supp. at 285.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Some candidates may seek to avoid what they consider to be the degrading task of
raising private funds. The late Senator Hubert Humphrey once stated that "the most
demeaning, disgusting, depressing and disenchanting part of politics is related to campaign
financing." 119 CONG. REc. 14985 (daily ed. July 28, 1973), quoted in Biden, Public Financ-
ing of Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. L. REv. 1, 9
(1974). Others may want to avoid the appearance of undue influence that may result from
private funding.
139. 487 F. Supp. at 283-89. It is possible, although unlikely, that the candidates in 1976
and 1980 would have been unable to raise more than the subsidies.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
141. 487 F. Supp. at 285.
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issues for the electorate" and "[elimination of] reliance on large
private contributions" and on the implicit obligations to private
contributors that may arise from such reliance without decreasing
the ability of the candidates to get their message to the people.'4
The court observed that without overall campaign expenditure limits,
these goals could not be achieved.
143
A. Preventing Undue Influence
In Buckley the Court accepted the argument that the interest in
preventing the reality and appearance of corruption justified contribu-
tion limits.144 It is unclear whether the Court applied strict scrutiny or
a lesser standard of review to the contribution limitations. 45 It is also
unclear whether the Court invalidated the overall campaign expendi-
ture limitations using strict scrutiny or a lesser standard of review.'
46
There is little doubt, however, that the Court would consider the pre-
vention of undue officeholder obligation to contributors to be a com-
pelling government interest. 147  Whether overall expenditure
limitations are necessary to accomplish the acknowledged compelling
state interest is a more difficult question. Arguably, low contribution
limits would be a less burdensome alternative for two reasons.I48 First,
142. Id at 284 (quoting S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5591-92).
143. 487 F. Supp. at 285-86.
144. 424 U.S. at 26-28.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
147. In Buckley, the Court referred to the "basic governmental interest in safeguarding
the integrity of the electoral process." 424 U.S. at 58. In Belloti the Court asserted that the
"importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption] has never been
doubted." 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
148. Although low contribution limits might be a less burdensome alternative in the
presidential general election, they may not be a feasible alternative in the presidential pri-
mary election. Very low contribution limits, not accompanied by generous public subsidies,
will make it very difficult for some candidates to adequately fund their campaigns. Presi-
dential primary campaigns are funded on the basis of matching grants for up to the first
$250 of a contribution. I.R.C. § 9034(b)(4). Unlike the general election in which subsidies
are large enough to fund the entire campaign, the level of subsidy in the primary election is
uncertain and may account for a small percentage of funds available to the candidate.
Matching is used in presidential primary elections because of the difficulty of devising other
fair and efficient methods for allocating primary subsidy funds. See D. ADAMANY & G.
AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 202-03
(1975).
Expenditure limitations may be viewed as a desirable alternative to very low contribu-
tion limits because expenditure restrictions take away the incentive for collecting numerous
large contributions; as a result, the opportunities for undue influence would be reduced and
candidates could raise sufficient funds to mount a serious campaign. See Lowenstein, supra
note 34, at 598 n.347; Note, Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law, 92 HARV. L.
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the Court has stressed that contribution limits, unlike expenditure limi-
tations, involve only "marginal" burdens on First Amendment inter-
ests.1 49 Second, it is unlikely that a small contribution would engender
any serious sense of obligation in an officeholder toward a contributor.
For example, even a $1,000 contribution made to a presidential candi-
date arguably would represent such a small proportion of total cam-
paign funds that it would have no serious influence on the elected
candidate. 150
Like the expenditure limitations attached to public subsidies in
RNC, the overall expenditure limitations invalidated in Buckley were
rationalized as a means of preventing undue influence. In Buckley,
however, the Court rejected this rationale and concluded that this inter-
est would be "served" by the FECA's contribution limitations and dis-
closure provisions."' The Court felt that any danger that the
contribution limitations would be circumvented was sufficiently dealt
with by the criminal penalties of the Act and by the possibility of polit-
ical repercussions. 52 The question that the Court did not explicitly ad-
dress in Buckley is whether contribution limitations and disclosure
requirements are sufficient to solve this problem. The clear implication
from Buckley is that the Court thought they were.'53 But if the Court's
conclusion is correct, then how can the same limitations attached to
subsidy provisions be necessary to prevent undue influence? Of course,
the district court did articulate another governmental interest, and per-
haps that interest was the basis for the Court's summary affirmance in
" C. 15 4
There are at least three arguments that would have permitted the
Court in RNCto rely on the undue influence rationale despite its rejec-
tion in Buckley as a basis to uphold expenditure limitations. First, the
Court might not have applied the same level of scrutiny to the limita-
tion because it was an "indirect burden" in the form of a condition on
REv. 451, 461 n.52 (1978). The Court in Buckley did not deal with this argument when it
invalidated limitations on campaign expenditures for candidates not accepting public subsi-
dies. Of course, the contribution limitations considered in Buckler may have been high
enough to assure adequate funding.
149. 424 U.S. at 20.
150. The Court in Buckley refused to consider whether the thresholds set by Congress for
contribution limitations were unnecessarily low. I at 30. See Nicholson, 1977 Wis. L.
Rav., supra note 18, at 347 n.105.
151. 424 U.S. at 55.
152. Id. at 56.
153. Id. at 55.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
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receiving the subsidy, rather than a direct burden on expression. 1"
Thus, the Court may have applied the analysis used to uphold the de-
nial of abortion funding in Maher and Harris.'56 Arguably, an interest
insufficient for strict scrutiny review would suffice for the level of scru-
tiny applied in those cases. A second possibility is that political events
in the seven years since Buckley caused the Court to conclude that con-
tribution limitations and disclosure do not sufficiently curb undue
influence. 15
7
It is inappropriate to view the problem of undue influence in the
context of an isolated campaign contribution. A number of $1,000,
$500, or even $100 contributions known to come from persons of like
concerns could create undue influence upon an officeholder. Even very
small contributions solicited from numerous persons with known pol-
icy preferences could cause an officeholder to consider the views of
those contributors over the views of non-contributors in some matters,
particularly in areas that attract little public attention. Thus, no matter
how low the contribution limit, it might not prevent contributors from
unduly influencing some officeholders. If candidates are aware of the
policy interests of contributors, only a complete ban upon contributions
can totally eliminate the problem of officials feeling obligated to their
financial backers. Those statutes that limit campaign expenditures to
the amount of the public subsidy, such as the federal statute applicable
to the presidential general election at issue in RNC, "I are in effect bans
on contributions.
One might question whether the burden on the First Amendment
expression of contributors that results from the total ban is too high a
price to pay for the alleviation of the undue influence which may arise
when numerous small and moderate contributions are given by like-
minded persons.1 59 In part, the answer depends on how commonplace
this scenario has become. With the emergence of many one-issue polit-
155. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107.
156. Id
157. See generally E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983). This conclusion could result
in a reversal of the Court's holding in Buckley that campaign expenditure limitations, apply-
ing to candidates not accepting public subsidies, are unconstitutional. 424 U.S. at 54-57.
158. In presidential primary elections, candidates are permitted to accept private contri-
butions because subsidies are allocated on the basis of matching grants. The need to totally
eliminate the undue influence of private contributions was presumably weighed by Congress
against the extreme difficulty of devising a fair and efficient formula for allocation in the
primary other than matching. See supra note 148. Even though private contributions are
permitted in the primary, the expenditure limitation reduces the incentive for raising numer-
ous private contributions, thus reducing the opportunities for undue influence.
159. In Buckley, the Court viewed the expression involved in a contribution as the com-
munication by the contributor to the candidate of his or her support. 424 U.S. at 21. Pre-
628 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:601
ical groups, which are regularly solicited by candidates for small or
moderate contributions, the incidence of officeholders feeling such in-
fluence may be substantial.16
0
If a majority of the Court were to accept the argument that small
to moderately sized contributions must be eliminated in order to pre-
vent corruption, they would be taking a position that may be inconsis-
tent with Buckley. In Buckley, the Court indicated that the $5,000 and
$1,000 contribution limitations were sufficient to prevent corruption. 161
Likewise, those same limitations arguably would be enough to prevent
corruption of candidates accepting public subsidies. However, the
Court did not focus on the undue influence that can flow from small
and moderately sized contributions. In Buckley, the Court stated that
"(t)he major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expendi-
tures is the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions."162
If the Court could be convinced that moderate and small contributions
also pose a danger of undue influence and corruption, arguably not
only would they uphold expenditure limitations, but they also might
conclude that expenditure limitations not attached to public subsidies
are constitutional. This reversal of Buckley could be grounded upon
recent empirical evidence that the contribution limitations have not in
fact been sufficient to prevent corruption. 63
The Court's summary affirmance in RNC might have been based
on reluctance to rationalize its decision upon a theory that could result
in reversal of one of its holdings in Buckley. Indeed, state courts con-
sidering public subsidies tied to expenditure limitations might share
that reluctance. It is possible, however, to base a rationale for affirm-
ance on the need to prevent undue influence from small and moderate
contributions without concluding that expenditure limitation, not at-
tached to public subsidies are constitutional.
With or without public subsidies, an expenditure limitation places
the same burden on campaign expression. If no more than thirty mil-
sumably this message could be communicated without a contribution; hence, the burden on
First Amendment interests is small. See infra note 164.
160. Some may contend that candidates do not seek financial assistance from such
groups unless they already share their policy concerns so that most contributions from those
sources actually produce no undue influence. Even so, the extent to which such organiza-
tions should be permitted to influence elections by virtue of their financial resources remains
an issue. If these assumptions are correct, the goal served by contribution restrictions would
be preventing undue influence on voters, another way of expressing the equalization ration-
ale that the Court rejected in Buckley. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
161. 424 U.S. at 55.
162. Id
163. See generally E. DREw, supra note 157.
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lion dollars can be spent on a campaign, the maximum amount of cam-
paign expression will be the same whether it comes from public, private
or both sources. 164 What does change, however, is the effectiveness of
the limitation in serving the goal of preventing undue influence. An
expenditure limitation not accompanied by public subsidies only
reduces the opportunity for corruption by the amount that could have
been raised over the limit. For instance, if forty million dollars could
have been raised and the limitation is thirty million dollars, the oppor-
tunity for corruption has been reduced by twenty-five per cent; if, how-
ever, ten million dollars comes from public subsidies and twenty
million dollars from private contributions, 165 undue influence has been
reduced by half,166 with no further reduction in campaign expres-
sion. 167 If the thirty million dollars comes entirely from public subsi-
dies, as is the case in the presidential general election, the opportunity
for undue influence is reduced to zero, 168 again with no further reduc-
tion in campaign expression.
Expenditure limitations without public subsidies reduce undue in-
fluence only slightly, and impose the same burden on campaign expres-
sion as limits accompanied by substantial subsidies. It is the
combination of limitations and subsidies that substantially reduces the
opportunity for corruption. The higher the subsidy, the greater the re-
duction in undue influence. Without expenditure limitations, subsidies
would have no effect on undue influence because contributions from
persons seeking such influence presumably would be used to augment
164. The only additional burden on expression that occurs when public funding substi-
tutes for private funding is upon the expression of those who are foreclosed from contribut-
ing. In Buckley, however, the Court described the expression of contributors as merely
informing the candidate of their support, and pointed out that there are other ways of ex-
pressing that support. 424 U.S. at 21-22. Would-be contributors are free "to become a
member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on
behalf of candidates." Id They can also make independent expenditures expressing their
support.
165. Subsidies in the federal primary and in some state general elections are based on
matching moderately sized private contributions, Larger contributions are also permitted
up to the contribution limit. Therefore, it might occur that the ratio of private to public
funding would be approximately two to one. The maximum amount of any contribution
that can be matched under federal law is $250. I.R.C. § 9033(b)(4) (1984). The contribution
ceiling, however, is $1,000 for individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974), as
amended by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976). For a discussion of state funding schemes see
H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS, 136-43 (2d ed. 1980).
166. Of course such a reduction will not take place to the extent that ways are found to
circumvent the restrictions. See generally, E. DREW, supra note 157.
167. See supra note 164.
168. See supra note 166.
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public subsidies. 169 Perhaps the Court in Buckley balanced the burden
upon expression caused by expenditure limitations against the need to
reduce undue influence caused by contributions below the statutory
limits, and found the benefit inadequate given the burden on expres-
sion. In a case involving subsidies, the greater benefit might cause the
balance to be struck differently. Although such an approach was not
articulated in Buckley, t7 0 it also was not rejected. This analysis could
be persuasive to state courts considering conditional subsidy legislation
under state constitutions.
B. Saving Time and Energy for Political Expression Other than Fund-
Raising
The district court in RNC pointed out that the legislative history of
the FECA indicated that an interest other than preventing corruption
supports the campaign expenditure restriction: "[t]o lessen the 'great
drain on [the candidate's] time and energies required by fund raising'
at the expense of providing competitive debate of the issues for the
electorate." 7' There are two aspects of this interest: the candidate is
personally benefitted by the removal of a burden and the electorate is
benefitted from increased communication.
Certainly, many candidates dislike the grueling and demeaning
task of raising money for their campaigns.' It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that removing this burden should alone be considered a compel-
ling government interest. Indeed, it is a burden that some candidates
would prefer to retain, otherwise the Republican National Committee
would not have challenged the constitutionality of the statutory restric-
tions on expenditures.
The second aspect of this interest is more compelling: by freeing
candidates from fundraising, more of their time will instead be spent
169. It is possible that private funding would not be so crucial to the campaign, and
therefore would not influence officeholders greatly. This seems unlikely, however, because
candidates probably judge their need for funding on what their opposition is spending; with-
out expenditure limitations that figure is frequently very high. See E. DREW, supra note 157.
170. In dealing with expenditure limitations as a means of preventing corruption, the
Court stressed the burden on expression and the fact that such limitations were not needed
due to the effect of other provisions. 424 U.S. at 55-58. However, it did not address the
question of undue influence flowing from moderate and small contributions because it
viewed "the major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures [as] candi-
date dependence on large contributions." Id at 55.
The Court in Buckley did seem to balance the burden against the benefit in dealing with
contribution limitations, which were found to be constitutional. Id at 58.
171. 487 F. Supp. at 284.
172. See supra note 138.
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communicating with the electorate, thereby increasing, rather than de-
creasing, overall communication. Presumably, candidates who are to-
tally or largely publicly funded will spend their time communicating
with undecided voters, rather than trying to convince those who al-
ready have decided to vote for them to contribute. Furthermore, fund-
raising traditionally has been accomplished by the candidate
communicating with small groups of "fat cats." 173 With expenditure
limitations, political communication should be improved because more
voters will hear the message, and those who need the information most
will be more likely to receive it.
To some extent, however, the notion that the expenditure restric-
tions actually enhance communication is flawed. The form of cam-
paign communication that reaches the greatest number of persons is
that which uses the media. It takes money to use media, and it is the
total amount of money used in the campaign that was limited by the
challenged restrictions in RNC.
Perhaps the expenditure limitations were actually based upon the
congressional judgment that expensive media advertising is a less bene-
ficial form of political expression than other less expensive means. The
slick prime time spot advertisement is probably the most expensive, yet
least informative, means of political communication. The district court
referred to freeing the candidates' time and energies for "competitive
debate of the issues for the electorate." '74 Presumably the reference
was not only to formal debates between the candidates,1 75 but more
generally to discussion of the issues by the candidates. Candidates who
cannot afford expensive media advertisements and who do not spend
their time and energy fundraising, may spend more time meeting with
groups of voters and using less expensive but more informative media
devices.1 76 The expenditure limitations thus may be seen as an attempt
to improve the quality of political expression at the expense of the
173. The $1,000 contribution limit probably makes it impractical'for candidates for fed-
eral office to spend much time meeting with small groups of wealthy persons. These candi-
dates, however, now probably spend their time meeting with those who control political
action committees (PACs). PACs can contribute up to $5,000 each, 18 U.S.C. §608(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1974), as amended by 2 U.S.C. § 44 l(a)(1)(C) (1976), and may influence mem-
bers to make individual contributions or work for candidates.
174. S. REP. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5587, 5591-92, quoted in RNC v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. at 284.
175. Decisions to debate opponents are usually made for reasons of strategy, and would
seem to have little to do with time or energy.
176. Nonprime-time television and radio, purchased in blocks of time longer than spot
advertisements, are less expensive per unit of time and are long enough to allow discussion
of issues rather than mere recitation of slogans. Newspaper advertisements are less expen-
sive than broadcast media and provide opportunity for issue discussion. Debates, press con-
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quantity of expression.' 77
V. Unconstitutional Condition Analysis in the California
Supreme Court
A number of states have adopted or are considering legislation
that would provide subsidies to state candidates conditioned upon cam-
paign expenditure limitations.7 8 After R]NC such statutes should pose
no problems under the federal Constitution; nevertheless, they may vi-
olate state constitutions. For example, such legislation is pending
before the California legislature. 79  Furthermore, the California
Supreme Court has adopted an approach to unconstitutional condi-
tions which is more sensitive to the protection of constitutional rights
than that of the United States Supreme Court. Although the precise
formulation of the rule is not entirely clear, 8 ° the California Supreme
Court has specifically rejected the restrictive interpretation of the un-
constitutional condition doctrine applied by the Supreme Court in
Maher and Harris. In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. My-
ers,18' a case involving substantially the same issue as Maher, the Cali-
fornia court repudiated the U.S. Supreme Court's "distinction between
a measure which denies other governmental benefits to women who
choose to have an abortion and one which simply denies funding for
the abortion itself."'8 2 The California Attorney General had argued
that based upon Harris "(t)he former measure. . . imposes an uncon-
stitutional penalty; the latter merely withholds funding for actions
which the state does not want to subsidize."' 83 The California court
responded that such a principle was inconsistent with California
precedent.' 84
Before Myers, however, no California case had invalidated the
simple failure to fund the exercise of a constitutional right using uncon-
ferences, and speeches, which may be reported in news programs and sometimes are
broadcast live also permit more in depth discussion than spot advertisements.
177. This could be viewed as an attempt to alter the content of political expression. Con-
tent discrimination is considered the most serious burden on the First Amendment. In addi-
tion, the Court has held that subject matter restrictions are to be treated with the same strict
scrutiny review as point of view restrictions. See Consolidated Edson, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980).
178. See supra note 21.
179. Id
180. See infra text accompanying notes 197-204.
181. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
182. Id at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
183. Id
184. Id
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stitutional condition analysis. 85 The court in Myers relied upon Wirta
v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,18 6 which had invalidated a
public transit policy of making advertising space available for commer-
cial messages, but not for political expression. This case could be
viewed as a failure to subsidize the exercise of a constitutional right;
perhaps it could also be an unconstitutional condition because a person
could advertise only on the condition that no political topics would be
addressed. 8 7 The court in Wirta, however, considered the issue as a
denial of access to a public forum;' 88 there was no reference to the un-
constitutional condition doctrine. 89
The California Supreme Court has been much more likely to find
a public forum than has the United States Supreme Court. In Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights,9 ' a case nearly identical to Wirta, the
Supreme Court found no public forum, and thus no First Amendment
violation. Furthermore, as the California Supreme Court pointed out
in Myers, the California courts have found unconstitutional conditions
in fact situations nearly identical to other cases in which the Supreme
Court has found no constitutional violations.191 For instance, in Parrish
185. See Comment, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Abortion
Funding ar an Unconstitutional Condition, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 993 (1982).
186. 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
187. The choice here is not so clear an alternative as the decision to have an abortion or
to agree to an expenditure limitation.
188. 68 Cal. 2d at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
189. Even the United States Supreme Court would find a First Amendment violation
where there has been discrimination on the basis of political ideas in the allocation of access
to a public forum. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
(city officials' refusal to allow the production of the musical "Hair" in a municipal theater
because the officials thought it obscene was a prior restraint forbidden by the First Amend-
ment). See generally Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor." Implicationsfor
Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1123 (1974); Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public
Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247,248,
255 (1976).
There is precedent, however, that predates the Court's abandonment of the right-privi-
lege distinction which would support the constitutionality of discrimination on the basis of
point of view in allocating the benefits of a public forum: in Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897), the Court upheld discrimination against an unpopular preacher in allocating
the use of the forum of a public park. But see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1950)
(denying Jehovah's Witnesses' right to use a public park while allowing use by other reli-
gious groups violates Equal Protection Clause); cf Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1971) (statute prohibiting all picketing near a school other than peaceful labor
picketing violates equal protection.); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (prohibition on
picketing in residential areas with exception for some peaceful labor picketing violates
Equal Protection Clause).
190. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
191. 29 Cal. 3d at 266-67, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
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v. Civil Service Commission,1 92 the California Supreme Court invali-
dated the practice of requiring welfare recipients to agree to home visits
by social workers as a condition of receiving benefits. A similar re-
quirement was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Wyman
v. James.'93 Furthermore, in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital
District,'94 the California court invalidated restrictions upon the polit-
ical activities of civil service employees; the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld similar restrictions.' The California Supreme Court in Myers
observed that "these cases indicate, for at least the past decade the fed-
eral decisions in this area have not been a reliable barometer of the
governing California principles."'196
After Myers, it seems unlikely that a California court would accept
the Supreme Court's distinction between a penalty and a mere failure
to fund. If the California Supreme Court considered expenditure limi-
tations to burden expression, the court would probably apply some
form of elevated scrutiny to an expenditure limitation conditioned on
the receipt of public subsidies.'97 The precise formulation of such a
standard of review is not clear. The plurality opinion in Myers pur-
ported to apply a three part test used in Bagley v. Washington Townshp
Hospital District 18
[First, the state] must establish that the conditions relate to the
purpose of the legislation which confers the benefit .... Sec-
ond ". . . the conditions [must] reasonably tend to further the
purpose sought by conferment of that benefit, [and] the utility of
imposing the condition must manifestly outweigh any resulting
impairment of constitutional rights. . . ." Third . . .the state
must establish the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and
192. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
193. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The alleged unconstitutional condition, which was asserted in
Justice Douglas's dissent, id at 326, was ignored by the majority.
194. 65 Cal. 2d 449, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); see also Fort v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
195. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973). It is unclear what standard of review was applied by the Court. See Rubin supra,
note 7, at 174 n.57.
196. 29 Cal. 3d at 267, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879-83.
197. Arguably Myers could be distinguished from a campaign subsidy case. In Myers,
the court stressed the special significance of the right of privacy, which is explicitly recog-
nized in the California constitution, as well as the severe burden on the right to privacy
caused by the failure to fund. Id at 274-80, 625 P.2d at 792-96, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 887-92; see
also id at 288-95, 625 P.2d at 800-05, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 887-91 (Bird, C.J., concurring). It
seems unlikely, however, that the California Supreme Court would view freedom of expres-
sion as less deserving of protection than the right to privacy, unless the court were to distin-
guish between restrictions based on content and quantity. See supra notes 116-20 and
accompanying text.
198. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
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demonstrate that the conditions are drawn with narrow specific-
ity, restricting the exercise of constitutional rights only to the ex-
tent necessary to maintain the integrity of the program which
confers the benefits.' 9 9
Chief Justice Bird, in a concurring opinion in Myers, rejected the
Bagley test; instead, she evaluated the "restrictions under the strict ju-
dicial scrutiny test used to assess any government action which burdens
the exercise of a fundamental right.'"2°° The second Bagley criteria-
whether the utility of the condition outweighs any impairment of con-
stitutional rights-appears to introduce a balancing test into the analy-
sis. 20 1 Thus, the Bagley test could be easier to meet than the
compelling government interest test. Chief Justice Bird was concerned
that the Bagley criteria might lead a court to try to balance "degrees of
burden and degrees of fundamentalness. ' 2°2 For instance, a strong
government interest in preventing corruption could outweigh a weak,
but nevertheless fundamental interest in unlimited expenditures. 2°3
199. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786-87, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (quoting
Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 505-07, 421 P.2d at 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
200. 29 Cal. 3d at 289, 625 P.2d at 801, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74 (emphasis in original).
The Chief Justice concluded that the Bagley test is simply "an early attempt by the court to
formulate a standard for this close scrutiny. Its precise formulation of the standard to be
used has been superseded by later developments." Id at 289 n.2, 625 P.2d at 801 n.2, 172
Cal. Rptr. 888 n.2. Chief Justice Bird also pointed out that the California Supreme Court
has previously "cited Bagley as authority for the proposition that the state could not impair
the exercise of a fundamental right without demonstrating a compelling interest." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). Chief Justice Bird's interpretation is supported by the actual opinion in Bag-
ley; the court, quoting from an earlier case, stated that "only 'compelling' public interests
can justify a governmental entity in demanding a waiver of constitutional rights as a condi-
tion of public employment." 65 Cal. 2d at 507, 421 P.2d at 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (quoting
Fort v. Civil Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d at 337, 392 P.2d at 388, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
201. Although the Bagley test does not explicitly require a finding of a compelling gov-
ernment interest, it seems unlikely that a court would allow an interest which is not truly
significant to outweigh the impairment of a constitutional right. Indeed, in determining
whether the asserted state interest is compelling, courts probably consider whether on bal-
ance the interest outweighs the burden imposed upon constitutional rights by the challenged
state action. In Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E. 2d 387 (1981), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a state ban that resulted in withholding
funding for medically necessary abortions for indigent women. The court rejected the
Supreme Court's analysis in Harris in favor of an approach similar to that of the California
Supreme Court. The Massachusetts court purported to apply the strict scrutiny test; how-
ever, the court explicitly stated that a balancing of interests is preferable to such a "rigid
formulation," and proceeded to invalidate the restriction on that basis. Id at 417 N.E.2d at
403-04. It is unclear whether the Massachusetts court was rejecting the compelling state
interest formulation or whether it was using a balancing approach in applying that test. Id.
at 417 N.E.2d at 403.
202. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 289-90 n.2, 625 P.2d at 801 n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 888 n.2 (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
203. Although the Supreme Court invalidated overall campaign expenditure limitations
not conditioned on receipt of public subsidies, the Court did not view these limitations as the
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Also, the two dissenting justices in Myers apparently accepted the view
of the United States Supreme Court in Maher that the mere failure to
fund the exercise of a right does not require the application of strict
scrutiny.2" Thus, several members of the California Supreme Court
might apply less than strict scrutiny review to candidate subsidy
provisions.
Even if the California court felt compelled by precedent to articu-
late strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review in a case chal-
lenging conditional subsidy legislation, this would not present an
insurmountable obstacle to affirmance. In Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley (CARC),2°5 four California Supreme Court justices
purported to apply strict scrutiny to an ordinance limiting contribu-
tions in ballot measure elections; nevertheless the court upheld the re-
strictions as necessary to prevent corruption of the political system.2 °6
Ballot measures ordinarily do not involve the corruption of officehold-
ers; therefore, the concept of corruption the court acknowledged as a
compelling state interest was the need to prevent disaffection from the
democratic process by voters who perceive that elections can be bought
through large contributions.207 Very little evidence of a link between
large contributions and voter disaffection was presented before the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in CARC.20 8 As a consequence, there is some
question whether the California court's articulation of a strict standard
of review actually described their methodology.20 9 The case does
most burdensome of the challenged restrictions in Buckley. See supra notes 27-30 & 34 and
accompanying text.
204. 29 Cal. 3d at 297-306, 625 P.2d at 806-12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 893-99. Justice Clark,
who joined Justice Richardson's dissenting opinion, has left the court. Justices Kaus and
Broussard have joined the Court since the Myers opinion.
205. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), rev'd. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
206. 27 Cal. 3d at 832, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
207. Id at 826, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. Political scientists have referred to
this as "systemic corruption" as opposed to the narrow concept of corruption of public
officials.
208. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of San Francisco at 27, CAIRC, 27 Cal. 3d 819,
614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980). See also Nicholson, 9 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 18, at
706-11.
209. See discussion in D. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions n.572
(1981) (paper delivered at annual meeting of American Political Science Ass'n, Sept. 2-6,
1981, New York City). This ambiguity in the standard of review is not unique to the Cali-
fornia Court. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724 (1974) and American Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (in which the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny without
determining whether the restrictions were necessary). See supra text accompanying notes
23-40 for a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's approach to some of the limita-
tions in Buckley. See also Nicholson, 1977 Wis. L. REv., supra note 18, at 354-355.
The California Supreme Court's decision in C4RC was overruled by the United States
Supreme Court because the Court did not find the rationale of preventing corruption of the
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demonstrate sensitivity to the policy concerns behind campaign finance
regulation, and a willingness to defer to the expertise of legislative bod-
ies in this area-an approach frequently not shared by the United
States Supreme Court, which overturned the California court's decision
in CARC. It seems unlikely that the California court would invalidate
a campaign finance restriction that has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court, regardless of the standard of review
articulated.21 °
This view is reinforced by the fact that the California court has
been much more sensitive to the issue of wealth discrimination than
has the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, the California court, in
contrast to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
United States Constitution,211 has found distinctions based on eco-
nomic class to be suspect for the purposes of review under the Califor-
nia Constitution's equal protection clause.21 2  In Myers, the court
commented in its opinion invalidating the failure to fund abortions for
indigent women that "[i]n the past, this Court has been particularly
critical of statutory mechanisms that restrict constitutional rights of the
poor more severely than those of the rest of society.1213 This concern is
also evident in the area of political rights. The California court invali-
dated a statute that required candidates for water district elections to be
political system to be sufficient to sustain the restrictions. It is not clear whether the majority
rejected the rationale entirely or merely determined that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the limitation was necessary to further that interest. See Nicholson, 9 ECOL.
L.Q., supra note 18, at 738-39. Because the Supreme Court in RWC upheld expenditure
limitations conditioned on public subsidies, the fact that the Supreme Court might not agree
with the California court's application of strict scrutiny would be purely academic. In fact,
the appellate court opinion in PNC resembled the California Supreme Court's analysis in
CA.RC in that neither opinion was specific about the need for the restrictions in question,
although each court purported to apply strict scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes
143-77.
210. Applying strict scrutiny review, the California Supreme Court has invalidated over-
all campaign expenditure limitations in ballot measure elections. Citizens for Jobs and En-
ergy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1976). The result in Citizensfor Jobs and Energy, however, was clearly required by the
Supreme Court's holding in Buckley that overall campaign expenditure ceilings in candidate
elections were unconstitutional. See supra note 3 1. Therefore, Citizensfor Jobs and Energy
should not be considered to represent the view that campaign expenditure limitations are
particularly burdensome under the California Constitution. Ballot measure elections in-
volve no realistic connection to preventing corruption of public officials; expenditure limita-
tions in candidate elections arguably do prevent undue influence of officeholders.
211. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth not a sus-
pect classification).
212. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610
(1971).
213. 29 Cal. 3d at 281, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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property owners;214 the United States Supreme Court, however, has up-
held statutes requiring voters in such elections to own property.215
Based on these precedents, the California court could take the po-
sition that the California equal protection clause reflects a stronger
commitment to political equality than does the federal constitution. 16
Campaign subsidies without expenditure limitations allow candidates
with ties to wealthy interests to greatly outspend those whose support-
ers have more modest means. Also, despite the United States Supreme
Court's rejection of equalization as a rationale for restrictions, 1 7 the
California court could assert that the rationale is consistent with and
even enhances the goals of the California Constitution's freedom of ex-
pression provisions. Indeed the court of appeals in Buckley had viewed
the goal of equalizing access to and impact upon the political process as
a countervailing First Amendment interest to be weighed against the
argument that limitations burden the First Amendment rights of the
wealthy.218 Thus, arguably, there would exist strong public policy in-
terests to offset any burden upon expression created by expenditure
214. Choudhry v. Iree, 17 Cal. 3d 660, 552 P.2d 438, 131 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1976) (invalidat-
ing requirement that candidates for the board of directors of a water irrigation district be
landowners).
215. E.g. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (rejecting a federal equal protection chal-
lenge to a statute limiting the right to vote in a water district election to landowners). The
California Supreme Court in Choudhry applied strict scrutiny analysis, whereas the Supreme
Court in Ball applied a rational basis test. The functions of the water districts were virtually
identical. The dissent in Ball agreed with the California Supreme Court's position in
Choudry. 451 U.S. at 385-86 n.9.
216. The appellate court in Buckley noted numerous Supreme Court cases invalidating
burdens upon the right to vote imposed on the basis of wealth, and asserted that "[o]urs is a
nation that respects the drive of private profit and the pursuit of gain, but does not exalt
wealth thereby achieved to undue preference in fundamental rights ...
It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individ-
uals, the wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than
the unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and because the
amounts they give and spend cannot be limited." 519 F.2d 817, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (over-
ruled 424 U.S. 1).
217. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
218. The court asserted that "[t]here is a positive offset to plaintiffs' invocation of the
First Amendment in the presentation by intervening defendants that the statute taken as a
whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values. By reducing in good measure dis-
parity due to wealth, the Act tends to equalize both the relative ability of all voters to affect
electoral outcomes, and the opportunity of all interested citizens to become candidates for
elective federal office. This broadens the choice of candidates and the opportunity to hear a
variety of views." 519 F.2d 817, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Judge Skelly Wright, who was among
the majority in the per curiam appellate court opinion in Buckley, has asserted his conviction
that "the 1974 legislation [chose] to move closer to the kind of community process that lies at
the heart of the First Amendment conception-a process wherein ideas and candidates pre-
vail because of their inherent worth, not because prestigious or wealthy people line up in
favor, and not because one side puts on the more elaborate show of support." Wright, Poll-
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limitations. 1 9
Even though the California courts would be free to interpret their
constitution differently than the federal constitution, so long as federal
rights were not infringed,220 it must be acknowledged that this ap-
proach would put a state court in a rather unusual position. It would
tics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976). See generally,
Karst, Equality as a Central Princoile ofthe First Amendment, 436 U. CHi. L. REV. 20 (1976).
219. It should be emphasized that this is a public policy argument and not an argument
that the California Constitution requires expenditure limitations. The California Supreme
Court has interpreted the California equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause not "to apply
broadly to all purely private conduct." Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (citing Kuger v. Wells Fargo Bank, I I
Cal. 3d 352, 366-67, 521 P.2d 441, 449-50, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 (1974)). The actions of
a candidate in spending huge sums on an election would not be considered state action,
particularly given the Burger Court's restrictive interpretation of that doctrine in recent
years. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For support of the view that private funding would consti-
tute state action, see Nicholson, Campaign Funding and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv.
815, 830-36 (1974). Of course, California courts are free to interpret their state action doc-
trine more broadly than that doctrine is applied in federal courts. See infra note 220. In-
deed, the California Supreme Court has implicitly done so in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, ajf'd447 U.S. 74 (1979). In Gay
Law Students Ass'n the California Supreme Court interpreted the California equivalent of
the federal Equal Protection Clause as applicable to employment discrimination even
though the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), had
rejected the argument that the actions of a regulated utility should be considered the
equivalent of governmental action for purposes of the Due Process Clause. Although the
California Supreme Court distinguished Jackson, arguing in part that "courts have applied a
different standard of state action in cases presenting procedural due process questions than
has been traditionally applied in cases involving discrimination under the equal protection
clause," 24 Cal. 3d at 474 n.9, 595 P.2d at 601 n.9, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 24 n.9 (citations omit-
ted), the court also made it clear that it was free to adopt a different interpretation of the
state action doctrine. Id at 496, 595 P.2d at 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that the California Supreme Court would go so far as to endow the expenditure of
privately donated campaign funds with the attributes of governmental action for purposes of
equal protection. This would be an extension of the state action doctrine that goes even
further than previous California cases. Such an approach would require the Court to either
choose an appropriate remedy itself, or require the legislature to do so. As the volume of
literature and litigation on campaign finance legislation suggests, effective remedies are com-
plex and expensive. The California court would probably prefer to avoid such a quagmire.
220. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) the Supreme Court
upheld a California Supreme Court decision interpreting the freedom of expression provi-
sion in the California Constitution to require private owners of shopping centers to allow
access to persons seeking a "forum for political expression"; in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972) the Court had interpreted the federal Constitution as not requiring such
access. The court in Pruneyard explained that the state may "adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." 447
U.S. at 81 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan has suggested that state courts should utilize
their power to expand individual rights to counteract the Burger Court's restrictive approach
to such rights. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
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be accepting as a sufficient state interest a rationale that has been re-
jected as insufficient to justify limitations on campaign expenditures
under the federal Constitution. Although the United States Supreme
Court would agree with the California court's result, its agreement
would be based upon different reasoning-possibly upon an approach
to unconstitutional conditions that affords less protection than that
given under state constitutions.221 State supreme court justices might
find it awkward to write an opinion expressing such views. Thus they
might prefer another approach to affirmance that would require less
inconsistency with the Supreme Court's approach in Buckley. There-
fore, the argument made in the last section, that expenditure limitations
combined with subsidies are much more effective in preventing undue
influence than such limitations without subsidies, and impose no addi-
tional burden on expression, would probably be accepted more
readily.222
VI. The Significance of Intent in the Unconstitutional
Condition Doctrine
The question of the role of intent in constitutional law doctrine is
confused at best. A finding of intent is necessary to a determination of
unconstitutionality in dealing with some issues, 223 and irrelevant when
dealing with others. 224 Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding
what is meant by intent.225 The significance of intent in unconstitu-
tional condition doctrine is no less confused than in other areas of con-
221. See supra text accompanying notes 70-94.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
223. Intent is a necessary element for a successful challenge of government discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and gender, Personnel
Admin. of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
224. Intent is apparently not necessary to a successful equal protection challenge alleging
discrimination on the basis of a fundamental right. For example, the apportionment cases
have not required a finding of intentional malapportionment. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Intent does not seem to be an element in cases finding infringement of First Amend-
ment rights. Nevertheless, Professor Geoffrey Stone has concluded that the Court's special
disfavor of content discrimination is rooted, in part, in the perception that content discrimi-
nation usually reflects an intent to prefer one point of view over another. Stone, supra note
118, at 103.
225. Some Justices seem to require a finding of ill will rather than merely an intent to do
an act. For instance, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179-80 (1976),
Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in the judgment that an apportionment plan which
had carved out districts with the purpose of permitting black voters to elect a representative
of their own race was constitutional. They stressed that the legislature acted not from a
purpose to disadvantage white voters, but because the Justice Department had asserted that
the Voting Rights Act required the creation of such districts.
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stitutional law. Although the Court seldom discusses the point, intent
to deter the exercise of a constitutional right probably existed in most
of the cases invalidating such conditions.226 In several cases, the War-
ren Court held that a finding of such an intent required that the gov-
ernmental action be invalidated.227 The Burger Court has, however, in
Maher and Harris22 8 and in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 229 rejected that
approach. This aspect of these cases has engendered much criticism
from legal scholars.230
226. The abortion funding cases are probably the clearest examples. See Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). However, other cases proba-
bly also involved such an intent. For instance, in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976),
requiring political support for party machine candidates by government workers probably
was motivated by the desire to induce them to forgo their right to support other candidates.
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the residency requirement for welfare recipi-
ents was probably aimed at inducing indigents to forgo their right to move to Florida. Un-
like the abortion cases, however, it seems likely that in these cases the attempt to induce
others to alter their conduct was motivated by practical, rather than moralistic concerns. In
Sherbert v. Verner, however, it seems unlikely that an intent to induce individuals to forego
constitutional rights was involved. See infra text accompanying notes 233-41.
227. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (invalidating residency restrictions
on receipt of welfare benefits); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (invalidat-
ing provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act that resulted in the possibility of a death pen-
alty only in jury trials); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1968) (heavier
sentence cannot be imposed as punishment for defendant who succeeded in having his origi-
nal conviction set aside).
228. See supra discussion of the abortion funding cases, at text accompanying notes 71-
107.
229. In Bordenkircher P. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld the ac-
tion of a district attorney who reindicted a criminal defendant on a more severe charge
because he refused to plead guilty and forgo his right to a jury trial. The Court stated, "It
follows that by tolerating and encouraging the negotiations of pleas, this court has necessar-
ily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at
the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty." Id
at 364.
230. See, e.g., Professor Jesse Choper's discussion in TRENDS, supra note 110, at 280-83,
287-88; Rubin, supra note 7 at 212. Professor Laurence Tribe criticized the statute upheld in
Maher as "only an attempt to achieve with carrots what government is forbidden to achieve
with sticks." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978). Professor Tribe
has changed his position and now supports the Court's approach in Maher and Harris. He
has asserted that "neutrality may be required with respect to religion and perhaps even with
respect to partisan politics, but not with respect to anything else." TRENDS, supra note 110,
at 290. Professor Gale Kamisar, apparently agrees with Professor Tribe's most recent posi-
tion. Id at 282. Professor Choper, however, would apply strict scrutiny whenever govern-
ment purposely attempts to induce persons to forego the exercise of constitutional rights. Id
at 277-88. He apparently would not limit the inquiry to purpose, however, and would also
invalidate statutes on the basis of impact in some situations. id
There are problems in applying either the Choper or the Tribe analysis. Tribe's ap-
proach leads to the conclusion that governments can discriminate in granting public subsi-
dies on the basis of their approval or disapproval of the views to be expressed as long as
neither partisan politics nor religion are the subject matter. Nevertheless, Tribe is correct in
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One should not necessarily assume that intent to deter the exercise
of a constitutional right will never again emerge as an important factor.
The Burger Court is adept at discarding its own doctrine when conven-
ience requires,231 and the abortion funding and plea bargaining cases
may turn out to be aberrations that are explainable on political, rather
than doctrinal grounds.232 In any event, state courts need not follow
the Court's approach in Maher, Harris and Bordenkircher, and may
view intent as an important factor when applying unconstitutional con-
dition doctrine under state constitutions.
In some fact situations it is easy to determine whether or not the
legislative body had an intent to deter the exercise of a constitutional
right. There was no serious doubt, for instance, that the failure to fund
abortions for indigent women was aimed at discouraging them from
having abortions.233 On the other hand, in Sherbert v. Verner,234 it is
extremely unlikely that the requirement that unemployment compensa-
tion recipients be available for Saturday work was an attempt to deter
the free exercise of some religions. The expenditure limitation attached
to public subsidies to candidates is not so easily categorized. If the
persons who promulgated the Saturday work requirement in Sherbert
thought about it at all, they were probably neutral with respect to
whether the regulation interfered with religious observance. In the case
of an expenditure limitation attached to candidate subsidies, propo-
nents have asserted that in order to serve the purposes of the subsidy,
asserting that "(p)urpose is a treacherous inquiry because it can be so easily manipulated."
TRENDS, supra note 110, at 286. While discussing Maher, Tribe noted that an inquiry into
intent involves "the problem of mirror images. [I]s. . . the [legislative] purpose to discour-
age and wash its hands of abortion-or to encourage and support healthy childbirth?" Id.
The issue of intent is further complicated by the fact that there are some forms of pur-
poseful discrimination which few would consider illegitimate. Tribe points out that even
though one may have a right to divorce, few would object if the government, in order to
discourage divorce, funded marriage counseling. Id at 387. Nor would many doubt the
constitutionality of a statute that seeks to discourage abortions by funding the costs of
childbearing for mothers who put their children up for adoption. Professor Choper would
simply apply strict scrutiny to such statutes and uphold them if they are necessary to further
a compelling government interest. Id at 295-96. Tribe, however, fears that such an ap-
proach would weaken strict scrutiny analysis. Id at 296.
231. Compare the language in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) to
FEC v. NRWC, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) supra notes 41-42, 46-51 and accompanying text. See
V. BLAsi, ROOTLESS AcTIvIsM, THE BURGER COURT 198-217 (1983).
232. See infra text accompanying note 244.
233. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that this was the purpose of the legislation.
Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-75. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. But see the mirror
image problem discussed supra note 230.
234. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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interference with the right to spend unlimited sums is necessary.23 5
The fact that it was contemplated that a burden on the exercise of a
constitutional right will be necessary should not, however, be enough to
find an intent to deter the exercise of that right. The Court has said
that legislators cannot do indirectly that which they are forbidden to do
directly;236 in the cases in which there seemed to be a clear intent to
deter the exercise of a constitutional right, this is precisely what the
legislatures were attempting to do. They could not ban abortion, so
they refused to fund it;237 they could not pass a law requiring support
of certain candidates, so they made such support a condition of govern-
ment employment;238 they could not prohibit jury trials, so they re-
quired abandonment of that right in order to obtain other favorable
treatment;239 they could not require loyalty oaths, so they made them a
condition of tax exemption. 240
The expenditure condition attached to candidate subsidies is dis-
similar to most cases in which an unconstitutional condition has been
found in that the statute is not merely a purposeful attempt to do indi-
rectly that which cannot constitutionally be done directly. There is
much more involved than a mere attempt to induce candidates to abide
by expenditure limitations. The intent is to create a public funding sys-
tem that will either greatly reduce or eliminate entirely reliance on pri-
vate funds.241 That goal can be accomplished only if subsidies are
combined with expenditure limitations.
Conclusion
In Maher and Harris, the Supreme Court ignored the serious bur-
den faced by indigent women seeking elective or medically necessary
abortions.2 42 Rather than focusing on the practical effect of the burden,
the Court applied a highly formalistic approach. The majority consid-
ered the mere failure to fund the exercise of a constitutional right not to
be a penalty, and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.2 43
One commentator has observed that "[t]he term 'penalty' thus seems
...to have evolved into a form of smoke screen behind which the
235. RNC v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. at 285-86.
236. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1971).
237. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
238. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 437 (1976).
239. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
240. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1959).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 70-88.
243. Id
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Court may make a nonstandardized decision as to whether it wishes to
find infringement. In actuality, the members of the Court seem to be
responding to unarticulated political or social concerns . ...
Maher and Harris are consistent with the Burger Court's opposition to
elevating the disadvantages of poverty to constitutional dimensions and
aversion to placing judicially created affirmative obligations upon
government.245
It is unclear whether the Court's summary affirmance in _ArC was
based upon the Maher-Harris analysis. Arguably, the Court would
have found that approach inappropriate because First Amendment in-
terests were at stake, rather than the "qualified" right to an abortion.2 4 6
This conclusion would, however, merely illustrate the emptiness of the
Court's formalistic approach to the unconstitutional condition prob-
lem. If the degree of burden were the determining factor, then a deci-
sion not to fund a medically necessary abortion should be subjected to
stricter scrutiny than a decision not to subsidize candidates who will
not accept expenditure limitations. The Court might also have avoided
strict scrutiny review in .RNC on the grounds that the statute restricted
the quantity of speech rather than the content of the expression. 47
Language in Buckley to the effect that restrictions on the quantity of
speech require strict scrutiny review2 48 might have been distinguished
as applying only to direct restrictions, and not indirect burdens in the
form of conditions.249
The district court in RNC did not apply the Maher-Harris analy-
sis. Instead, the court concluded that the restriction would not result in
a diminution in the quantity of speech.25° Alternatively, it asserted that
even if there were such a diminution, the restrictions were necessary to
further compelling government interests. The Court has yet to address
the rationale proffered in .RArC of saving candidates' time and energy
for political expression other than fundraising as a rationale for restric-
tions.25' Although preventing undue influence was also asserted as a
244. Rubin, supra note 7 at 212. See also V. BLASI, supra note 231.
245. See L. TRIBE, supra note 230, at 1118-36. Professor Tribe noted "[t]he Burger
Court's enormous reluctance to tell the states how to spend their scarce resources, and its
willingness to tolerate-indeed occasionally its own adoption of-pejorative generalizations
about the poor." Id. at 1129-30.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
247. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
250. See supra text accompanying note 135.
251. The Court in Buckley did refer to this rationale as one of the bases for the congres-
sional decision to publicly fund candidates. 424 U.S. at 91, 96.
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rationale in RNC and probably is a compelling government interest,25 2
in Buckley the Court rejected the argument that the expenditure limita-
tions are a necessary concomitant to contribution limitations to prevent
corruption. It is difficult to see how such limitations could be necessary
to prevent corruption when attached to public subsidies, but not when
standing alone.25 3 Of course, the summary affirmance in RNC may
have been based on evidence since Buckley showing that contribution
limitations and disclosure are not enough to substantially reduce the
problem of undue influence on public officials.25 4 Furthermore, the
Court could have reasoned that expenditure limitations coupled with
subsidies restrict campaign expression no more than expenditure limi-
tations alone and are much more effective in preventing undue influ-
ence. Thus, using a balancing approach, the Court might have upheld
the statute in RNC without overruling Buckley. This approach would
have involved an analysis different from, but not necessarily inconsis-
tent with, that used in Buckley to deal with expenditure limitations.255
Two other rationales applicable to the expenditure limitation con-
dition on subsidies were explicitly rejected by the Court in Buckley.
Such expenditure limitations could be an effective method of equaliz-
ing the resources available to opposing candidates for political expres-
sion, and of reducing the costs of political campaigns.256 If these were
the articulated interests, however, the limitations might be considered
invalid as purposeful attempts to induce candidates to forego their con-
stitutional rights to spend unlimited funds in their campaigns and to
outspend their political opponents.25 7 Thus, the legislation upheld in
R"C might have been viewed as an attempt to do indirectly that
which, after Buckley, Congress could not do directly. If the Maher-
Harris analysis were applied, however, such a purpose probably would
not even result in strict scrutiny review.258
In light of the theoretical difficulties inherent in the various analy-
ses that could have been used to validate the restrictions in RNC, it is
252. See supra text accompanying notes 144-70.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
254. Such an approach would seemingly make it possible for the Court to uphold expen-
diture limitations not attached to subsidies if Congress or state legislatures were to enact
them. See supra text accompanying notes 157-63.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
256. The Court in Buckley pointed out, however, that expenditure limitations are an
imperfect method of equalizing because candidates with name identification will have an
advantage over others. See supra note 99. Also, costs might continue to rise, because such
limitations would not affect independent expenditures.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 & 34.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 223-40.
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not surprising that the Court preferred a summary aflirmance to a fully
reasoned opinion. Lurking behind the summary affirnance in RC
may have been second thoughts about some of the Court's more dog-
matic pronouncements in Buckley. Could the spectre of a candidate
substantially outspending the opposition by accepting thirty million
dollars of public funds and raising another eighty million dollars have
caused the Court to reconsider whether it is always inconsistent with
the First Amendment for government to .attempt to limit the overall
costs of campaigns259 or to restrict the voices of some in order to en-
hance the voices of others? 260 More basically, does the Court still fully
believe that giving and spending money in a political campaign is the
equivalent of speech?
26
'
State courts, like the United States Supreme Court, have several
different avenues for validating expenditure limitations as conditions
for receiving public subsidies by candidates. Those state courts which
reject the Maher-Harris analysis that a "mere" failure to fund cannot
be an unconstitutional condition may feel constrained to apply strict
scrutiny to such limitations.2 62 In addition to the persuasive argument
that such limitations are necessary to prevent undue influence, state
courts could validate the restrictions using rationales not available to
the United States Supreme Court. Those courts may interpret their
state constitutions in a different manner than the Supreme Court has
interpreted comparable federal constitutional provisions. Because con-
ditional expenditure limitations were upheld under the federal Consti-
tution in RNC, such state court interpretations would not infringe upon
federally protected rights.263 A state court could conclude that, despite
the Supreme Court's rejection of the equalization rationale, that ration-
ale is consistent with and even enhances the goals of the freedom of
expression provisions in that court's state constitution.264 Alternatively,
state courts could determine that their state equivalent of the Equal
Protection Clause mandates a stronger commitment to political equal-
259. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 57.
260. Id at 48-49. In 1972 the last presidential general election in which the candidates
were not publicly funded, President Nixon spent over sixty million dollars, more than
double the amount spent by Senator McGovern. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS
5 (2d ed. 1980). In 1980, the Presidential candidates in the general election received
$29,440,000 each in federal subsidies. 1980 Federal Election Comm'n Annual Rep. 16.
261. Id at 16-17. For an in depth critique on the Court's conclusion that in the context
of political campaigns, money is speech, see Wright, supra note 218.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 180-210.
263. See supra note 220.
264. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
Spring 1983] SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 647
ity than does the federal Constitution.2 65 Even though expenditure
limitations should not properly be thought of as constitutionally com-
pelled,266 state equal protection provisions may be considered as re-
flecting a strong state interest in equality that would be sufficiently
compelling to offset the burdens upon expression.267 In states such as
California where, unlike the United States Supreme Court,268 the high
court has held that wealth is a suspect classification for purposes of the
state equal protection clause,2 69 such an interpretation would be partic-
ularly appropriate.27 0 Given the various theories available to state
courts desiring to uphold such restrictions, it should not be necessary to
use the analysis of Maher and Harris in which the United States
Supreme Court established precedent for a serious erosion of protec-
tion under the federal unconstitutional condition doctrine.
See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 219.
See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 211.
See supra note 212.
But see supra text accompanying notes 220-22.

